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The proper limits to attorney-client confidentiality are hotly debated by lawyers
and legal scholars. Various drafts of the proposed Model Rules of Professional Con-
duct have included controversial provisions which call for the disclosure of adverse
evidence and client perury, as well as more liberal disclosure of completed and in-
tended client wrongdoing than is currently permitted under the Model Code of Pro-
fessional Responsibility. This Article takes a comparative approach to the problem,
utilizing a body of philosophical literature which explores the principle of confidenti-
ality in the physician-patient context This "philosophically informed" approach sets
out an analytical framework in which the controversies surrounding attorney-client
confidentiality can be critically evaluated and provides new insights into a continuing
debate.
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INTRODUCTION
FOR CENTURIES lawyers have debated the proper limits of at-
torney-client confidentiality.1 The debates have intensified as a
result of recent efforts to replace the American Bar Association's
Model Code of Professional Responsibility (Model Code)2 with an
entirely new ethics code for lawyers-the Model Rules of Profes-
sional Conduct (Model Rules).' Various drafts of the proposed
Model Rules have included such controversial provisions as the dis-
closure of adverse evidence4 and client perjury5 in litigation, and in
nonlitigation, the disclosure of completed and intended client
wrongdoing beyond that presently permitted under the Model
Code.' With the sole exception of client perjury,7 the ABA House
of Delegates decisively rejected the efforts of its Commission on
Evaluation of Professional Standards (Kutak Commission) to ex-
pand both required and permissive disclosure of client confidences.8
1. The earliest debates concerned the legal rule of the attorney-client evidentiary privi-
lege rather than the ethical standard for lawyers' conduct. See infra notes 97-111 and accom-
panying text. Perhaps the most famous debate was that between Jeremy Bentham and Dean
Wigmore. See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS OF COMMON LAW §§ 3196-3204 (1905)
(including excerpts from Bentham's RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EVIDENCE and Wigmore's
own rebuttal). For a summary of the various legal arguments made during the formative
years of the testimonial privilege, see Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client
Privilege, 66 CALIF. L. REV. 1061 (1978).
2. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1983).
3. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1983). After specific amendments
were adopted in August, 1982 and February, 1983, the Model Rules were adopted by the
ABA House of Delegates on August 2, 1983. As of October, 1985, seven states (Arizona,
New Jersey, Montana, Minnesota, Missouri, Washington and Delaware) had formally
adopted the Model Rules with some amendments. See LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT, CURRENT REPORTS (BNA) 905 (Aug. 21, 1985); id. at 901 (Sept. 18,
1985).
4. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
5. See infra note 189 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 229-98 and accompanying text.
7. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
8. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983) (disclosure
permissible only to prevent imminent death or substantial bodily harm) with MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (disclosure permis-
sible to prevent future crime or fraud when threatened harm is substantial). Earlier versions
of the Model Rules had provided for even more expansive disclosure than would have been
permitted under the Proposed Final Draft submitted to the ABA House of Delegates. See
infra notes 165, 217-19, 286, 289 and accompanying text.
In some minor respects, the disclosure of otherwise confidential information was more
restrictive under the Proposed Final Draft than under the Model Code. See infra note 216.
Nonetheless, the thrust of the Proposed Final Draft was clearly to expand both required and
permissive disclosure.
For a discussion of an extremely important instance in which the Model Rules, as
adopted by the ABA House of Delegates, permits substantially less disclosure than is permit-
ted under the Model Code, see infra notes 211-21 and accompanying text.
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Nonetheless, the ABA's action is not binding on individual jurisdic-
tions, and the various confidentiality and disclosure provisions con-
tinue to be hotly debated.9
Numerous arguments have been presented for and against dis-
closure in the particular situations in which the problem arises. In
essence, the disagreement between proponents and opponents of
disclosure is a result of differing assumptions of fact1" and differing
judgments regarding the lawyer's primary function in the Anglo-
American legal system." As to the former, the facts are often un-
proved and perhaps unprovable. 2 As to the latter, given that the
lawyer historically has been thought to have dual functions-as "of-
ficer of the court" and as individual client representativel 3-it is not
surprising that lawyers fail to agree whenever these functions ap-
pear to conflict.
In an effort to break the deadlock of "arguments that do not
meet each other," 14 one commentator-a philosopher-has begun
to explore "the moral limits, complexity and limits of confidential-
ity,"15 first in ordinary, non-professional contexts and then in the
professional context of the attorney-client relationship. This work
and other recent works by philosophers in legal ethics' 6 are interest-
ing and provocative. Not only do the moral philosophers offer a
fresh perspective on age-old problems, but they also provide valua-
9. Indeed, of the seven states which have formally adopted the Model Rules, four have
amended the confidentiality provision. See LAWYERS' MANUAL ON PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT, CURRENT REPORTS (BNA) 905 (Aug. 21, 1985); id. at 961 (Sept. 18, 1985). In addi-
tion, most state bar associations that have recommended adoption of the Model Rules have
proposed amending the confidentiality provisions. Id. at 835 (June 26, 1985). The formally
adopted and proposed amendments, however, are by no means uniform. Id.
10. See infra notes 176-81, 223-25 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 153-63, 167-68 and accompanying text.
12. See infra notes 223-24 and accompanying text.
13. See, eg., Callan & David, Professional Responsibility and the Duty of Confidentiality:
Disclosure of Client Misconduct in an Adversary System, 29 RUTGERS L. REv. 332, 335
(1976) (discussing the role of the advocate in adversary litigation).
14. Landesman, Confidentiality and the Lawyer-Client Relationship, in THE GOOD
LAWYER 191, 194 (D. Luban ed. 1983).
15. Id. at 193.
16. See THE GOOD LAWYER (D. Luban ed. 1983) (includes chapters by a number of
philosophers, including Alan Donagan, Virginia Held, Gerald Postema, Richard Wasser-
strom and Bernard Williams); M. BAYLES, PROFESSIONAL ETHics (1981); A. GOLDMAN,
THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHics 90-155 (1980). For one explanation
of the recent emergence of philosophical interest in professional ethics generally and, more
recently, in legal ethics, see Luban, Introduction, in THE GOOD LAWYER 4-8 (D. Luban ed.
1983).
The recent work by philosophers in the field of legal ethics is not without its critics. See,
e-g., Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal Ethics, 1984 Wis. L.
REV. 1529.
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ble expertise in analyzing the broader ethical framework in which
professional norms ultimately must be justified. Thus, other profes-
sions and occupations-most notably medicine, business and engi-
neering-have already profited from an ongoing dialogue with
moral philosophers in areas of common concern. 17 Similarly, the
introduction of an explicit "philosophically informed"18 approach
to legal ethics may be of assistance in moving the legal profession
beyond the current confines of the confidentiality and disclosure
debate.
Rather than beginning with philosophical literature, which deals
with the principle of confidentiality in ordinary morality, and then
attempting to apply the principle directly to the legal profession,
this Article proposes to take a comparative approach, utilizing a
body of philosophical literature which explores the principle of con-
fidentiality in another professional context-the physician-patient
relationship. The benefit of the comparison is two-fold. First, the
philosophical literature on medical ethics suggests a useful method-
ology for approaching similar problems in legal ethics. Second, the
comparison of confidentiality in medical and legal ethics is designed
to confront directly the differences between the two professions, but
to do so in a way that emphasizes the need for a common moral
framework-that is, a framework in which the significance of these
17. See K. CLOUSER, TEACHING BIOETHICS: STRATEGIES, PROBLEMS, AND RE-
SOURCES 73-77 (1980) (partial bibliography on recent literature in biomedical ethics); T.
BEAUCHAMP & N. BOWIE, ETHICAL THEORY AND BUSINESS (2d ed. 1983) (cases and mater-
ials on general business ethics, with extensive references to other recent writings); CENTER
FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICS IN THE PROFESSIONS, A SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY IN ENGINEERING (1980).
18. Luban, Calming the Hearse Horse: A Philosophical Research Program for Legal Eth-
ics, 40 MD. L. REV. 451, 452 (1981). By "philosophically informed," Luban means "a litera-
ture that is philosophically sophisticated but specific to the legal context." Id. at 475-76. For
some good examples of "philosophically informed" literature, see supra note 16; Flynn, Pro-
fessional Ethics and the Lawyer's Duty to Self, 1976 WASH. U.L.Q. 429; Fried, The Lawyer as
Friend: The Moral Foundations of the Lawyer-Client Relationship, 85 YALE L.J. 1060 (1976);
Greenebaum, Attorneys' Problems in Making Ethical Decisions, 52 IND. L.J. 627 (1977); Ro-
senfeld, Between Rights and Consequences: A Philosophical Inquiry into the Foundations of
Legal Ethics in the Changing World of Securities Regulation, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 462
(1981).
Thus, the author does not purport to initiate an entirely new approach to legal ethics, but
rather to continue an exploration that has become increasingly popular among both lawyers
and philosophers. Moreover, lacking any formal training in moral philosophy, the author is
reluctant to characterize the Article as "philosophically sophisticated." However, the pur-
pose of a dialogue between lawyers and philosophers is to take advantage of the expertise that
is unique to each profession. Unless lawyers are willing to venture beyond the "familiar
public-policy approach utilized in traditional legal analysis," Luban, supra, at 475, there will
be no common ground upon which lawyers and philosophers can meet.
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differences can be critically evaluated. 9
Part I of the Article sets forth a brief history and synopsis of the
principle of confidentiality as it has been applied to the physician-
patient relationship, by physicians themselves and, more recently,
by moral philosophers. As will be seen, the primary contribution
by the philosophers in this area has been the analysis of the initial
justification of the confidentiality principle and the delineation of its
limitations, within the framework of those ethical theories presently
dominant in the field of moral philosophy. Part II demonstrates
how this philosophical literature on medical ethics can be used to
resolve (or at least reformulate) some of the dilemmas now con-
fronting the legal profession. Part II(A) notes briefly how differ-
ences in historical development have affected the treatment of
confidentiality in the two professions and considers the limited sig-
nificance of some obvious differences in function and circumstance.
Part II(B) examines in detail several specific problem areas: in liti-
gation, the nondisclosure of adverse evidence and client perjury
and, in nonlitigation, the significance of such factors as the nature of
the harm threatened, the legal status of the client's conduct, and the
distinction between completed and intended wrongs.
As will be seen, the author has reached her own conclusions on
many (if not all) of the specific confidentiality dilemmas addressed.
Nonetheless, the primary purpose of the Article is not to persuade
the reader that these conclusions are correct, but rather to point out
some of the difficulties of much of the current thinking on these
problems and, in so doing, to redirect the ongoing debates in a dif-
ferent and more fruitful direction. It is hoped that the Article will
make a significant contribution to the continuing search for a prin-
cipled resolution of the perennial and seemingly intractable problem
of the proper limits to attorney-client confidentiality.
19. Despite the recent popularity of a philosophical approach to professional ethics,
there is very little work being done of a comparative nature. But see M. BAYLES, supra note
16; A. GOLDMAN, supra note 16. The author has found such comparisons to be extremely
useful as a teaching device; law students find it far easier to take the viewpoint of a consumer
of medical services than of legal services.
1985]
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I. THE PRINCIPLE OF CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE PHYSICIAN-
PATIENT RELATIONSHIP: JUSTIFICATION AND
LIMITATIONS
A. Historical Development: Codes of Ethics and Ethical
Traditions of the Medical Profession
Within the Western tradition of medical ethics, the fundamental
tenet of medical confidentiality originated some twenty-three hun-
dred years ago by a physicians' guild on the island of Cos in ancient
Greece.20 The Hippocratic Oath contains the following pledge:
What I may see or hear in the course of treatment or even
outside the treatment in regard to the life of men, which on no
account one must spread abroad, I will keep to myself, holding
such things shameful to be spoken about.
21
Although this statement has been characterized as amounting to
"little more than a general declaration against gossiping,"'2 2 it con-
stitutes the core of the Hippocratic tradition of professional confi-
dentiality, a tradition which has greatly influenced the development
of more modern medical ethics codes.23 Strong echoes of the Hip-
pocratic Oath with its urgings toward gentlemanly conduct appear
in the first modern textbook of physicians' ethics, Thomas Perci-
val's famous MEDICAL ETHICS, published in England in 1803:
Secrecy and delicacy, when required by peculiar circumstances,
should be strictly observed. And the familiar and confidential
intercourse, to which the faculty are admitted in their profes-
sional visits, should be used with discretion and with the most
scrupulous regard to fidelity and honour.24
Percival's statement appeared almost verbatim in the first Principles
of Medical Ethics adopted by the American Medical Association in
1847.25
Modern codes of medical ethics have dropped the language of
gentlemanly honor; however, two aspects of the Hippocratic tradi-
tion continue to have a profound effect on the manner in which
most physicians view the obligation of confidentiality. The first is
the recognition that the obligation is not absolute. The Hippocratic
Oath clearly implies that there are some things that "may be spoken
20. See R. VEATCH, A THEORY OF MEDICAL ETHICS 18-19 (1981); Walters, Ethical
Aspects of Medical Confidentiality, in CONTEMPORARY ISSUES IN BIOETHICS 169 (1978).
21. Walters, supra note 20, at 169.
22. Riddell, The Law and Ethics of Medical Confidences, [1927] 2 LANCET 4-5.
23. See Sidel, Confidential Information and the Physician, 264 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1133,
1133-34 (1961); Waiters, supra note 20, at 169.
24. Walters, supra note 20, at 169.
25. Id.
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abroad."2 6 While a few international medical codes appear to en-
dorse an absolute obligation,27 the vast majority of modem codes
recognize some limitation on the principle of confidentiality,
although the precise limits vary from code to code.28
The second aspect of the Hippocratic tradition, prominent in
Percival's statement, is an emphasis on the "discretion" of the phy-
sician to determine for himself what moral conduct is required in
individual cases. In its most recent version of the Principles of
Medical Ethics, the American Medical Association (AMA) reaf-
firmed the historic status of the Principles not as "laws, but stan-
dards of conduct which define the essentials of honorable behavior
for the physician."29 In addition, the rider habitually attached by
the British Medical Association when giving "advice" to its mem-
bers explicitly states that it is open to the doctor to act in accord-
ance with the dictates of his conscience.30
Despite this strong tradition of individual conscience,3' modem
codes and medical commentators do attempt to provide guidance to
physicians for determining when disclosure of patient confidences is
ethically permissible. For example, the code of the British Medical
Association is highly restrictive. It limits disclosure of patient con-
26. T. McCONNELL, MORAL ISSUES IN HEALTH CARE: AN INTRODUCTION TO MEDI-
CAL ETHICs 31 (1982).
27. See World Medical Association, Declaration of Geneva (1948) in T. MCCONNELL,
supra note 26, at 30 ("I will hold in confidence all that my patient confides in me."); World
Medical Association, International Code of Medical Ethics (1949) in T. McCONNELL, supra
note 26, at 30 ("A doctor owes to his patient absolute secrecy on all which has been confided
to him or which he knows because of the confidence entrusted to him."). While these codes
appear to permit no exceptions, they have been interpreted to allow for disclosure in a few
specific situations, such as reporting the incidence of epidemic or communicable diseases. See
Side], supra note 23, at 1134 (reporting interpretive statement by Eighth General Assembly in
Rome, 1954).
28. See infra notes 31-36, 44 and accompanying text.
29. American Med. News, Aug. 18, 1980, at 172, quoted in R. VEATCH, supra note 20,
at 311.
30. See Dawson, The Duties of the Doctor as a Citizen, [1954] 2 BRIT. MED. J. 1474,
1478.
31. This tradition appears to reflect what Veatch characterizes as the dominant charac-
teristic of professional medical ethics--"the conviction that cases are unique" and "that every
patient presents his or her own unique set of problems that cannot be resolved by rigid appli-
cation of some legalistically formulated rule." R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 307-08. See also
New Horizons in Medical Ethics--Confidentiality, [1973] 2 BRIT. MED. J. 700, 702 (statement
of Dr. Ronald Gibson) ("It's often forgotten that every situation is different from every other
one, and has to be treated on its merits.") [hereinafter cited as New Horizons]. Perhaps this
tradition of individual conscience explains the notable lack of deference given to ethics codes
in many physician discussions of ethical dilemmas. See, eg., Sidel, Medical Ethics and the
Cold War, 191 NATION 325 (1960) (no mention of applicable code provision in extensive
discussion of confidentiality and its limits).
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fidences to situations in which absent such disclosure, "statutory
sanction would be imposed." 32  Thus, disclosure is permissible
under public health laws designed to prevent the spread of conta-
gious disease and, in some jurisdictions, under laws requiring the
reporting of gunshot wounds or other evidence that a serious crime
has been committed.33 In addition, physicians may disclose to
avoid being held in contempt of court for failure to give testimony
that is not protected by the physician-patient privilege.34
The most recent version of the AMA Principles of Medical Eth-
ics is also highly restrictive, although less so than its British coun-
terpart. The AMA Principles state: "A physician shall respect the
rights of patients, of colleagues, and of other health professionals,
and shall safeguard patient confidences within the constraints of
the law."35 Like the British Code, the AMA Principles tie disclo-
sure of patient confidences to legal considerations and permit dis-
closure to avoid statutory sanctions. In addition, the AMA
Principles permit disclosure to avoid civil liability, particularly in
the form of negligence actions for failure to warn others of some
danger posed by the patient.36
The restrictive view of these codes does not have uniform sup-
port among their respective constituents. Even prior to the recent
collaboration between physicians and philosophers, many medical
commentators recognized a broader moral duty to breach confiden-
tiality in some circumstances,37 particularly when necessary to
avoid serious physical harm to others. Typical examples given in-
32. See T. MCCoNNELL, supra note 26, at 31.
33. See id. at 36.
34. Most, but not all, jurisdictions recognize an evidentiary privilege for patient-physi-
cian communications. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 98 n.5 (3d ed. 1984). For a discussion
of the scope of the privilege, as well as some of the issues raised in its application, see gener-
ally id. at §§ 98-105.
35. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS, IV quoted
in T. MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 269.
36. See Tarasoffv. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14 (1976) (defendant psychotherapists held to have a legal duty to inform plaintiff's
daughter that an outpatient had threatened to kill her). Tarasoffis discussed more fully in
infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
Indeed, one might speculate that the AMA's decision to narrow its disclosure provision
was at least partially a response to the Tarasoff decision, in which the court cited the more
liberal disclosure provision in the prior version of the AMA Principles as a factor in its
determination that disclosure was legally required. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 441-42, 551 P.2d
at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27. For a discussion of the possible significance of Tarasoffin recent
decisions by the American Bar Association to narrow the range of permissive disclosure for
lawyers, see infra note 249.
37. See, e.g., Dawson, Professional Secrecy, [1922] 1 LANCET 619, 621-22; Riddell, supra
note 22, at 5-8; Sidel, supra note 23, at 1137.
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elude the epileptic patient who is a railway engine driver 38 and the
patient who is planning to commit a violent crime.39 This moral
duty to disclose is commonly perceived both as a professional duty,
arising from the physician's central function of preventing sickness
and other physical harm," and as a personal or social duty, arising
from the physician's role as a citizen in society.4' Moreover, the
physician's moral duty is typically viewed as encompassing not only
disclosures beyond those required by law, but also occasional refus-
als to disclose in defiance of the law-in explicit recognition of the
distinction between law and ethics.4'
It is clear that the highly restrictive codes do not reflect any
consensus among physicians regarding the relative importance of
confidentiality in relation to other interests.43 However, the prior
version of the AMA Principles, which permitted disclosure when-
ever necessary "to protect the welfare of the individual or the com-
munity,"'  was equally unrepresentative. Even aside from the
38. See New Horizons, supra note 31, at 701. See also Dawson, supra note 30, at 1476
(84% of physicians responding to survey stated that physician has duty to report patient's
epilepsy to railway authorities, contrary to restrictive disclosure provision in official code); T.
MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 37-38 (duty to report epileptic driver or bus driver with a
heart condition).
39. See, eg., Side], supra note 31, at 326. Of course, as a result of Tarasoff, physicians
now have a legal duty to protect victims in at least some of these cases. See infra note 71.
Prior to Tarasoff, however, the obligation was strictly moral.
40. See, eg., Sidel, supra note 23, at 1135 (physician should report food handler with
typhoid fever because of professional duty to prevent disease).
41. See, eg., id. (doctor's role as citizen may require him to report patient with gunshot
wounds); Dawson, supra note 37, at 622 ("We regard the protection of the confidences of our
patients as vital [but in] what we consider a sacred trust we are not unmindful of our duties as
citizens."); Riddell, supra note 22, at 5-6 ("A doctor shares with other citizens the duty to
assist in the detection and arrest of a person who has committed a serious crime."); id
("there are occasions in which the duty imposed by a professional relationship should be
subordinated to the higher duties of common humanity").
42. See, eg., Sidel, supra note 23, at 1136-37 (psychiatrist should have refused to give
evidence against patient, even if not privileged, because "conscience and ethics take prece-
dence over law"); id. at 1136 (citing with approval oath taken by German physicians in West-
ern Zones in 1947: "I shall not recognize any other laws than those of humanity, of love of
my fellow man and of unselfish readiness to help."); of Dawson, supra note 37, at 621 ("occa-
sions occur in which other considerations properly override those of the law").
43. See Dawson, supra note 30, at 1475, 1478 (survey found that a large percentage of
British doctors favored disclosure in confidentiality dilemmas, despite BMA's official position
that disclosure is prohibited except when required by statute).
44. AMERICAN MEDICAL ASSOCIATION, PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETmICS § 9 (1957).
A physician may not reveal the confidences entrusted to him in the course of medi-
cal attendance, or the deficiencies he may observe in the character of patients, un-
less he is required to do so by law or unless it becomes necessary in order to protect
the welfare of the individual or of the community.
Id., quoted in T. MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 269. For a discussion of the evolution of the
1957 AMA Principles, see Sidel, supra note 23, at 1134.
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
obvious question of paternalism, 45 physicians did not agree that dis-
closure was appropriate whenever it might marginally enhance the
welfare of society." Nonetheless, the medical community has been
unable, or unwilling,47 to formulate relatively specific standards
governing the permissibility of disclosure which address such con-
troversial questions as the role of physicians in law enforcement,4"
the prevention of injury other than serious physical harm or
death,49 and the extent to which the possibility of physical harm to
others overrides the confidentiality principle.5" While philosophers
have by no means solved the practitioner's dilemma in these cases,
they have begun a systematic effort to delineate the boundaries of
45. In 1971, the British Medical Association eliminated its prior provision which per-
mitted disclosure when in the patient's best interest. This change was made in response to an
infamous case in which a physician reported to the parents of a teenager that she was taking
birth control pills. See T. MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 31. For philosophical discussions
of the broad question of paternalism in medical ethics, see generally T. BEAUCHAMP & J.
CHILDRESS, PRINCIPLES OF BIOMEDICAL ETHICS 168-79 (2d ed. 1983); T. MCCONNELL,
supra note 26, at 63-89; R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 190-213.
46. Aside from their obvious concern for the ethical principle of confidentiality, doctors
were also aware that they could be sued in tort for breach of a fiduciary relationship. While
the fact that an overriding social obligation necessitated the disclosure is a defense to such an
action, not all social interests are found to be more important than the patient's interest in
privacy. Unfortunately, courts have been no more successful than doctors in setting out use-
ful guidelines for determining when disclosure in the public interest is justified. See Note,
Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy Outside the Courtroom, 36 U. CiN. L. REv. 103, 104-15
(1967); Note, Legal Protection of the Confidential Nature of the Physician-Patient Relation-
ship, 52 COLUM. L. REv. 383, 397-98 (1952); Note, Medical Practice and the Right to Privacy,
43 MINN. L. Rlv. 943, 954-60 (1959).
47. The apparent unwillingness of physicians to adopt specific guidelines is clearly a
function of their strong tradition of individual conscience, see supra notes 30-32 and accom-
panying text, and their equally strong conviction that "every situation is different from every
other one, and has to be treated on its merits." New Horizons, supra note 31, at 702.
48. Compare Riddell, supra note 22, at 7-8 (doctor has same duty as every other citizen
to aid in the detection and arrest of persons who have committed serious crimes) with Gaylin,
What's an FBI Poster Doing in a Nice Journal Like That, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE
90 (1976) (criticizing the extension of medicine into police functions) and Chayet, From Con-
fidentiality and Privileged Communications, in MORAL PROBLEMS IN MEDICINE 1009 (1976)
(assistance in arrest of alleged killer may be justified only to prevent future danger to the
community).
49. Compare, e.g., Dawson, supra note 37, at 622 (physician should disclose if he knows
a "cruel wrong is to be inflicted on an innocent party, whether it be in ordinary civil life, or
during legal proceedings") with Sidel, supra note 23, at 1137 (physician should not disclose
confidences "except under very special circumstances such as the prevention of communica-
ble diseases or prevention of a specific criminal act"). Of those physicians who favored dis-
closure, significantly fewer favored disclosure to prevent fraudulent claims for industrial
injury benefits than favored disclosure to prevent serious bodily harm. Dawson, supra note
30, at 1477-78. The important factor may have been that the resulting injury was to the state,
not to an individual person.
50. See infra notes 71-75 and accompanying text.
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confidentiality, utilizing the initial justification for the physician's
obligation of confidentiality as their focal point.
B. The Philosophically Informed Approach
to Medical Confidentiality
1. Initial Justifications for the Principle of Confidentiality
There are two primary philosophical approaches to justifying
the principle of confidentiality in the physician-patient relation-
ship."1 The first, utilitarian, is concerned with the probable long-
term consequences to society when confidentiality is not observed.
The second, deontological, is based on the principle that respect for
a patient's right to privacy justifies confidentiality.
a. Utilitarian Theory. There is no single, commonly accepted
definition of the ethical theory of utilitarianism, which is itself one
of several teleological (or consequentialist) theories. Teleological
theories (as distinguished from deontological theories) measure the
worth of actions solely by their ends and consequences; in other
words, the "right" is subordinate to the "good."52 The term "utili-
tarianism" refers to the particular teleological theory which holds
that there is one and only one basic principle in ethics-the princi-
ple of utility. That principle holds "that an action or practice is
right (when compared with any alternative action or practice) if it
leads to the greatest balance of good consequences or the least possi-
ble balance of bad consequences in the world as a whole." 3
There are several varieties of utilitarian theory. 4 For purposes
of this Article, the term "utilitarianism" refers to "rule utilitarian-
ism" (as opposed to "act utilitarianism"), in which the principle of
utility is applied not to individual acts, but rather to rules of con-
duct that are used as guidelines to determine which acts are right or
51. A third approach currently popular in medical ethics is discussed infra note 61 (a
form of social contract theory based on the work of John Rawls). Yet a fourth approach
focuses on the moral worth of persons rather than on correct actions and policies. This
approach is commonly referred to as "virtue ethics" and has its origin in the classical tradi-
tion of Plato and Aristotle. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 260-68.
For an interesting application of this approach in legal ethics, see Williams, Professional Mo-
rality and Its Dispositions, in THE GOOD LAWYER, supra note 16, at 259.
52. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 20.
53. T. BEAUCHAMP, PHILOSOPHICAL ETHICS 73 (1982).
54. The earliest influential utilitarians were David Hume and Jeremy Bentham; how-
ever, the major exposition of utilitarian theory is generally attributed to John Stuart Mill. See
J. MILL, UTILrrARIANISM (1863). For a comprehensive summary of the varieties of utilita-
rian theory, including an extensive bibliography, see T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 71-
106.
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wrong.5 This Article will assume that the "good" is to be mea-
sured in terms of individual preferences determined by each individ-
ual's actual behavior, as opposed to happiness, pleasure or some
other experience assumed to have intrinsic value to the individual.5 6
The utilitarian justification for the principle of medical confiden-
tiality is that confidentiality encourages patients to fully disclose
their symptoms and causes so that they may receive effective diag-
nosis and treatment. 7 There is no empirical proof that, absent a
professional principle of confidentiality, large numbers of patients
would fail to make sufficient disclosure. However, given the inti-
mate and embarrassing nature of many conditions for which pa-
tients seek treatment, philosophers using the utilitarian approach
generally agree that the possibility of deterrence is sufficient to jus-
tify the confidentiality principle.5 8 Because health is a relatively un-
controversial "good" to be maximized, and because the harm that
might result from protecting certain confidences can be eliminated
by subsequent limitations on the principle, the initial justification of
medical confidentiality has not been a problem for utilitarian
theorists. 9
b. Deontological Theories. Deontological theories hold that
"some features of acts other than, or in addition to, their conse-
55. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 25-32.
Act utilitarians justify actions by direct appeal to the principle of utility. For an argu-
ment in favor of act utilitarianism over both rule utilitarianism and deontological theory, see
Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in UTILITARIANISM: FOR AND AGAINST
(1973). Act utilitarianism is generally rejected because it appears to sanction acts commonly
thought to be unjust and in violation of individual rights, e.g., enslaving a small portion of
society in order to solve major social problems. See T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 90-91.
Rule utilitarianism, however, is criticized on the grounds that consistency with ordinary
moral convictions is an inadequate test of a moral theory and that, in any event, when applied
to concrete moral dilemmas, it cannot be distinguished from act utilitarianism. See id. at 91,
96.
56. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 23-25.
57. Id. at 230. The utilitarian justification is deemed to be of special significance to the
psychotherapist. According to one psychiatrist, the "patient in analysis must learn to free
associate and to break down resistance to deal [sic] with unconscious threatening thoughts
and feelings. To revoke secrecy after encouraging such risk-taking is to threaten all further
interaction." Walters, supra note 20, at 171 (citing to Ruben, Confidentiality and Privileged
Communications: The Psychotherapeutic Relationship Revisited, 41(6) MED. ANNUALS OF
THE DIST. OF COLUM. 365 (1972)). For a more extensive discussion of the application of
utilitarian theory to the psychotherapist whose patient threatens physical harm to another,
see infra notes 71-75, 77-78 and accompanying text.
58. See Walters, supra note 20, at 170-71.
59. As will be seen, however, the lack of empirical proof as to the level of expected
deterrence does pose problems for utilitarians in determining when the principle of confiden-
tiality ought to be overridden by interests other than those of the patient. See infra notes 72-
73 and accompanying text.
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quences make them right or wrong."6 Deontologists believe that it
is possible for an action or rule of action to be the morally right one
even if it does not lead to the greatest balance of good over evil.
There are many different deontological theories, including "act de-
ontology" and "rule deontology."' 1 Most of the medical ethics
literature and this Article focus on rules rather than acts and are
"pluralistic" in that they "affirm more than one basic rule or princi-
ple."62 Both deonotological theories commonly refer to respect for
60. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 33. The most influential deonto-
logical thinker was clearly Immanuel Kant. See I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE META-
PHYSICS OF MORALS (Lewis White Beck trans. 1959).
61. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 36-37. See generally T.
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 107-45 (including an extensive bibliography of major works
on deontological theories).
A third philosophical approach to medical ethics is based on what many consider to be a
form of deontological theory-the social contract theory of John Rawls. See id. at 112-15.
Rawls postulates hypothetical contractors, in what he calls the "original position," who must
agree to a set of principles of justice. J. RAWLs, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 17-22 (1971). The
restrictions on the original position are that no one should be advantaged or disadvantaged in
the choice of principles by natural fortune or social circumstances; thus, he imposes a "veil of
ignorance" under which "no one knows his place in society, his class, position or social sta-
tus; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abilities." Id. at
137. While Rawls himself uses this hypothetical contract approach for the specific purpose of
deriving principles of justice, other philosophers have borrowed the concept to derive a
broader set of principles providing the moral foundations of society. See, eg., A. GOLDMAN,
supra note 16, at 29-31; R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 110-26, 141-290. Indeed, some philos-
ophers have extended this concept even further to envision a second hypothetical contract in
which members of society and members of the medical profession must agree to principles
governing their relationship. See, ag., R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 127-34. This second
contract is generated within the context of the more basic social contract and is, therefore,
limited by the principles of that contract. Id.
As with other deontological theories and with utilitarianism, social contract theory
presents certain difficulties both in theory and in application. See generally READING RAWLS
(N. Daniels ed. 1975). These difficulties alone should not eliminate social contract theory as a
useful philosophical approach to professional ethics. Nonetheless, because its application in
professional ethics often yields conclusions which appear to either mimic or incorporate the
conclusions of the two more traditional approaches, see infra note 67, the author has chosen
not to use social contract theory as a third basic approach in the body of the text. There are,
however, certain points at which social contract theory may offer unique insights, and thus
references to the theory will be made at numerous points in the footnotes. Hopefully, philos-
ophers more conversant than the author in social contract theory will continue to further
develop its application to problems in legal and other professional ethics.
62. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 35-36. The most famous
attempt by a philosopher to articulate a single supreme principle of moral theory is Kant's
"categorical imperative," which states "I should never act in such a way that I could not also
will that my maxim should be a universal law." I. KANT, supra note 60, at 24. A later
formulation states: "One must act to treat every person as an end and never as a means
only." Id. at 54-55. However, most philosophers agree that Kant's single principle is simply
inadequate to resolve apparent conflicts of duties. See T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 124.
The pluralistic approach in rule deontological theory was developed by a twentieth cen-
tury British philosopher, W.D. Ross. According to Ross, there are several moral duties, none
19851
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
a person's "rights." While rights can be justified under either utili-
tarian or deontological theory, rights which are based on respect for
persons, for autonomy or some other nonutilitarian principle are
clearly deontological.63
With respect to medical confidentiality, the basic deontological
rule or principle places great emphasis on respect for a patient's
right to privacy. While philosophers using this approach do not
agree on either the source or the precise nature of this right,64 the
most common view is that it is derived from an even more basic
right to autonomy (or, as some put it, "respect for persons") and
thus "[expresses] the right to self-determination in contexts involv-
ing personal information, giving moral authority to the individual's
interest in determining what will be known about him or her.",61
To illustrate the value of privacy in the physician-patient rela-
tionship, philosophers in medical ethics commonly employ a model
of concentric circles:
In the center is the "core self," which shelters the individual's
of which derive from each other or from any other supreme moral principle (such as Kant's
categorical imperative). These duties include fidelity, reparation, gratitude, non-maleficience,
beneficience and justice. Conflicts between these duties are resolved by finding the greatest
balance of right over wrong in a particular situation. W. Ross, THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD
(1930). See also infra notes 68, 76 and accompanying text.
63. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 49-55. For an expanded
discussion of rights under both utilitarian and deontological theories, see generally T.
BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 185-218 (including extensive bibliography).
64. See, eg., Rachels, Why Privacy is Important, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 323 (1975)
(privacy protects social relationships); Reiman, Privacy, Intimacy and Personhood, 6 PHIL. &
PUB. AFFAIRS 26 (1976) (privacy protects individual's interest in "personhood"); Scanlon,
Thomson on Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 315 (1975) (privacy protects interests in free-
dom from offensive intrusions); Thomson, The Right to Privacy, 4 PHIL. & PUB. AFFAIRS 295
(1975) (privacy is not an independent right but can only be explained by reference to other
rights over person and property). See generally PRIVACY (J. Pennock & J. Chapman ed.
1971).
65. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 230-31. For an expanded (and
more detailed) discussion of this view, see Benn, Privacy, Freedom and Respect for Persons, in
TODAY'S MORAL PROBLEMS 8 (R. Wasserstrom ed. 1975). Another view is that rather than
being derived from an even more basic and comprehensive principle, privacy has its own
fundamental nature and importance. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 230.
According to this view, "privacy itself is a basic human need," and thus "the moral right to
privacy is superior to other rights grounded in less basic ethical claims." Id.
In addition to disagreements regarding the source of the right to privacy, there are dis-
agreements regarding its scope. Thus, some would limit privacy to control of whether and
how private information about oneself is communicated, while others would include other
aspects of personal autonomy, including the ability to determine whether or not to perform a
particular act or undergo a particular experience. PRIVACY, supra note 64, at xi.
These debates aside, the concept of privacy does appear to have a "commonly accepted
core of meaning," id., which clearly includes the desire to control access to the type of inti-
mate facts about one's body or mind that are typically revealed to a physician.
[Vol. 36:177
AY7TORNEY-CLIENT CONFIDENTIALITY
ultimate secrets-those hopes, fears, and prayers that are beyond
sharing with anyone unless the individual comes under such
stress that he must pour out these ultimate secrets to secure emo-
tional release. ... [T]he next largest circle contains intimate
secrets which can be shared with close relatives or confessors of
various kinds. Successively larger circles are open to intimate
friends, to casual acquaintances, and finally to all observers.
The principle of medical confidentiality can be based squarely
on this general right of privacy. The patient, in distress, shares
with the physician detailed information concerning problems of
body or mind. To employ the imagery of concentric circles, the
patient admits the physician to an inner circle. If the physician,
in turn, were to make public the information imparted by the
patient-that is, if he were to invite scores or thousands of other
persons into the same inner circle-we would be justified in
charging that he had violated the patient's right of privacy and
that he had shown disrespect to the patient as a human being.
66
Because of this obvious connection between privacy and the physi-
cian-patient relationship, many philosophers have identified respect
for the patient's right of privacy as the most appropriate source of
the obligation of medical confidentiality.
6
2. Limitations on the Obligation of Confidentiality
Once the philosopher establishes an initial justification for the
professional obligation of confidentiality, the next step is to deter-
mine the stringency or weight of this duty. The consensus among
philosophers is that the obligation of confidentiality is neither abso-
lute nor a mere "rule of thumb," but rather a "prima facie obliga-
tion"-that is, one that can be overridden, but only by other,
66. Walters, supra note 20, at 171. See also T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note
45, at 231-32. For the argument that the very significance of the right to privacy relates to
the ability to form personal relationships by sharing different levels of information about
oneself, see C. FRIED, AN ANATOMY OF VALUES: PROBLEMS OF PERSONAL & SOCIAL
CHOICE 140-44 (1975); Rachels, supra note 64, at 323. This argument is criticized in Rei-
man, supra note 64.
Obviously not all patients admit to the physician their "core self." As a result, some
efforts have been made to determine relative degrees of sensitivity of confidential information
as an aid to determining when disclosure might be morally appropriate. See infra note 86 and
accompanying text.
67. See, e.g., S. BOK, SECRETS 116-31 (1982); H. BRODY, ETHICAL DECISIONS IN
MEDICINE 53 (2d ed. 1981); see also AMERICAN HOSPITAL ASSOCIATION, PATIENT'S BILL
OF RIGiTS 5 (1973), reprinted in T. MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 272,
Under social contract theory, see supra note 61, patients promise to disclose highly per-
sonal information in return for their physician's promise to keep that information confiden-
tial. Physicians agree to this contract because they need such information to perform their
work. Patients agree either because they fear unless they disclose the information to their
physician they will receive inadequate treatment (utility) or because they desire to keep such
information private (privacy). See R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 185-89.
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weightier considerations.68 Like physicians, however, philosophers
do not always agree whether and when various other "considera-
tions" will be sufficiently weighty to override the duty to preserve a
patient's secrets. Nonetheless, to the extent that the philosophers
have begun to systematically articulate the nature and scope of
these legitimate considerations, their arguments may prove fruitful
not only to the physician but to the attorney as well.
Under the utilitarian approach, there are two fundamental ques-
tions which must be answered in order to determine the limits of the
obligation of confidentiality. The first is to what extent the possibil-
ity of disclosure will in fact deter patients from divulging sufficient
information to obtain adequate treatment. The second is whether
the harm done by disclosure, both short-term and in the long-run,
outweighs or is outweighed by the harm thereby prevented, both in
the particular case and in potential future cases. Neither question
appears to pose any serious difficulty for utilitarians in situations
typically encountered by physicians, including the legally required
reporting of serious, contagious diseases, child abuse, or gunshot
wounds, and, even absent any legal obligations, those cases in which
a patient's medical problem presents a clear and substantial danger
to the lives or health of many other individuals, by virtue of the
patient's occupation.6 9 Perhaps this is so because the risk of harm
to society is great in these cases and, in addition, because there is
little reason to believe that disclosure will result in substantial deter-
rence, either among the relatively small group of patients whose
confidentiality will be breached or among the larger group of pa-
tients outside the scope of these limited and well-defined exceptions
68. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 232-33; Walters, supra note
20, at 173. Kant's categorical imperative was an absolute duty, i.e., one not subject to being
overridden by apparently conflicting duties. See supra note 62. The concept of "prima facie
duties" originated in the pluralistic rule-deontological moral theory articulated by philoso-
pher W.D. Ross. See id.
While most philosophers agree that confidentiality may be breached in at least some in-
stances, usually involving threats of serious harm to others, there may be some support for a
nearly absolute obligation, at least in the case of fully autonomous patients. See Englehardt
& McCullough, Confidentiality in the Consultation-Liason Process: Ethical Dimensions and
Conflicts, 2 PSYCH. CLINICS OF N. AM. 403 (1979) (disclosures of confidential information
probably unwarranted absent fully informed consent). Ironically, in seeking support for their
extreme position, the authors refer to the tradition of nearly absolute protection of client
confidences by the legal profession. Id. at 406-07.
For a fictional account of the absurdity of a confidentiality obligation which gives no
recognition at all to the interests of anyone other than the patient, see B. FRIEDMAN, Mr.
Prinzo's Breakthrough, in FAR FROM THE CITY OF CLASS 88 (1963) (in order to test psychia-
trist's vow of absolute secrecy patient murders psychiatrist's wife).
69. See supra note 38.
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to the obligation of confidentiality.7"
A more difficult case for utilitarians, one which exposes some of
the weaknesses of utilitarian theory in general, involves the psycho-
therapist who believes that his patient may commit a violent act.71
Here, there is serious disagreement regarding both of the questions
posed above. First, it is by no means clear how many patients will
be deterred from entering treatment by the possibility of disclosure,
or, having entered treatment, will be deterred from disclosing their
violent fantasies.72 Second, even assuming that some degree of de-
terrence could be shown, it is unclear whether more lives will be
saved by permitting the physician to disclose in the present case or
by requiring him to maintain confidentiality, thereby increasing the
likelihood that potentially dangerous patients will seek treatment in
future cases.73 Moreover, utilitarians face the perennial problem of
comparing harms of entirely different natures. For example, it has
been said that psychiatrists have a tendency to over-predict danger-
ousness.74 If so, the psychological and perhaps economic harm
done to a potentially large number of patients who, in fact, pose no
real threat must be balanced against the potential loss of life in the
far smaller number of cases in which a threat is actually carried
OUt.
7 5
70. Cf T. McCoNNELL, supra note 26, at 34 (arguing against absolute duty of confiden-
tiality on ground that clearly defined exceptions can avert, for the most part, bad conse-
quences such as patients losing confidence in doctors).
71. This controversy was generated by the decision in Tarasoff v. Regents of Univ. of
Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976). Tarasoffheld that the defend-
ant psychotherapists had a legal duty to inform the plaintiff's daughter that an outpatient
(Poddar) had threatened to kill her. The defendants decided that Poddar should be commit-
ted for observation in a mental hospital and notified the police requesting assistance. How-
ever, the police, believing Poddar to be rational, released him. The defendants made no
further effort to confine Poddar or to notify the girl or her parents. For a discussion of the
legal aspects of this decision, see Stone, The Tarasoff Decisions: Suing Psychotherapists to
Safeguard Society, 90 HARv. L. Rav. 358 (1976) (concluding the duty of a physician to
disclose sensitive information is incompatible with effective treatment and would deter both
patients and therapists from undertaking treatment, thereby increasing the risk of violence to
society). See generally Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Di-
lemma, 62 CALIF. L. REv. 1025 (1974) (concluding that the question of whether the physi-
cian should disclose information, although based on the medical findings of the physician, is
one ultimately for judges and juries to make).
72. See, ag., Fleming & Maximov, supra note 71, at 1039-44. At least one post-Tarasoff
article indicates that the deterrent effect feared by psychiatrists has not in fact materialized.
See Wulsin, Unexpected Clinical Features of the Tarasoff Decision: The Therapeutic Alliance
and the "Duty to Warn," 140 Am. J. PSYCHIATRY 601 (1983).
73. See, eg., T. MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 39.
74. See, ag., Fleming & Maximov, supra note 71, at 1044.
75. For an example of one post-Tarasoff attempt to compare dissimilar values and inter-
ests, see infra note 88.
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Under the deontological, nonutilitarian approach, the limits to
confidentiality are derived by determining when the patient's right
to privacy is overridden by some other equal or more basic right or
duty.76 Thus, with respect to the foregoing psychiatrist's dilemma,
one deontologist has stated that "a person's life counts for more
than the doctor-patient relationship.""17 Another has similarly con-
cluded that "[i]t is not right . . . to risk one person's life in order to
help patients and reduce the violence in society." 78
In situations involving contagious diseases and occupational
hazards, deontologists appear to agree with utilitarians that disclo-
sure may be justified when the danger is both clear and direct. The
reason usually given is that the duty to prevent serious bodily harm
overrides a patient's right to privacy.7 9 Another rationale for dis-
closure, suggested by a moral theologian, is that a patient who in-
tentionally subjects others to unwarranted risks or harms is an
"unjust aggressor" who thereby forfeits his right to privacy. 80 This
argument has not gained much explicit recognition in the recent
philosophical literature. 81 However, it may explain why a more dif-
ficult dilemma is thought to exist in a case where the patient is not
the source of potential harm to others, for example, when a patient
with a diagnosed genetic defect refuses to notify other family mem-
bers who are at risk.82 In any event, those who derive the right to
76. See, e.g., T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 233; Walters, supra note
20, at 171-73; cf. H. BRODY, supra note 67, at 22-23 ("the only thing that is strong enough to
override a right is an equal or more basic right of another"). While the concept of an "equal"
right or duty sounds very much like a utilitarian measure, some deontological theories resolve
conflicts between various rights and duties by seeking the "greatest balance of right over
wrong." T. BEAUCHAMP, supra note 53, at 125 (discussing deontological theory of W.D.
Ross).
77. H. BRODY, supra note 67, at 54.
78. S. BOK, supra note 67, at 129.
79. See, eg., H. BRODY, supra note 67, at 57.
80. R. REGAN, PROFESSIONAL SECRECY IN THE LIGHT OF MORAL PRINCIPLES 104-06
(1943). According to Regan, the professional is obligated to keep a client's secret only so
long as "the client retains the right to his secret." Id. at 97. Moreover, "[w]hen a person is
planning to use his right of professional secrecy as a sword rather than a shield and becomes
the formal cause of evil to others, his aggression may be resisted." Id. at 106. To illustrate
this principle in the medical context, Regan cites the example of a syphilitic patient who
refuses to inform his fiance6 of his medical condition. Id. at 148.
81. But see T. MCCONNELL, supra note 26, at 38 (approving physician who assisted in
apprehension of mass murder suspect). According to McConnell, murderers forfeit some
individual rights. They pose a threat to innocent people, and the fact that it is not an inno-
cent threat makes the case for breach of confidentiality even stronger than the case involving
a patient with a contagious disease. Id. Cf. C. FRIED, RIGHT AND WRONG 42-49 (1978)
(defenses to intentional harms based on forfeiture of "victim's" right to personal respect).
82. See, eg., Murray, Genetic Counseling, in 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHIcS 559
(1978).
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privacy from the more fundamental right to autonomy, or self-de-
termination, would clearly limit a patient's range of choices when
he intentiorially subjects others to unjustified risks of serious bodily
harm.8 3
To a large extent, the second approach avoids the empirical
problems of utilitarianism. However, it does encounter similar
problems of conflicting values, particularly when the patient cannot
clearly be characterized as an "unjust aggressor." There are no
generally agreed upon criteria for establishing priorities among the
various rights and duties arising out of the physician-patient rela-
tionship; nor do such criteria exist for determining when generally
accepted priorities must give way to extreme interests. For exam-
ple, while it is generally agreed that the duty to prevent harm is
more compelling than the duty to confer benefits, a clear distinction
between the two is not always possible,"4 as is perhaps the difficulty
in the case of the patient with genetic defects who refuses to notify
other family members. Moreover, the duty to prevent a "trivial
harm" may not be as compelling as the duty to confer a major bene-
fit,8" as might be argued in the case of certain areas of medical re-
search and education.
There may be resistance to the suggestion that violations of con-
fidentiality may be characterized as "trivial" or perhaps even as less
than substantial harms. Nonetheless, efforts have been made to as-
sign relative degrees of sensitivity to different types of informa-
tion. 6 These efforts accord with the notion of concentric circles of
privacy so popular with proponents of the nonutilitarian ap-
proach.87 This "grading" of information is not intended to be de-
terminative. Nevertheless, it may provide some basis for
determining when the abstract "right to privacy" may be overrid-
den by other abstract rights and duties, within the context of a spe-
cific case.88
83. Cf, eg., S. BOK, supra note 67, at 129 ("The autonomy we grant individuals over
personal secrets . . . cannot reasonably be thought to extend to plans of violence against
innocent persons.").
84. See T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 235.
85. Id.
86. See, eg., Walters, supra note 20, at 174 (discussing an information grading system
used by several Swedish hospitals).
87. See id
88. Under the social contract approach to confidentiality, the limits of the physician's
obligation are determined by reference to the hypothetical promise-keeping agreement be-
tween members of society and the profession itself. See supra note 61. Exceptions to confi-
dentiality are then postulated in light of social concerns arguably more important than those
underlying the initial agreement to have some rule of confidentiality. The leading proponent
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Given the difficulties in applying both utilitarian and deontolog-
ical theories, it is obvious that philosophers have by no means
solved the confidentiality problems now confronting the medical
profession. Nonetheless, their attempts to systemize the initial obli-
gation and to delineate its appropriate limits-within the frame-
work of the two most widely accepted theories of normative
ethics-may prove useful to the legal profession in evaluating the
quality of moral reasoning now being offered on both sides of the
various confidentiality debates. The application of the "philosoph-
ically informed" approach to some of these debates is the subject of
the remainder of this Article.
II. CONFIDENTIALITY IN THE ATrORNEY-CLIENT
RELATIONSHIP
A. Introduction: The Prima Facie Obligation and Some Initial
Comparisons of the Medical and Legal Professions
There is a two-fold benefit to exploring new approaches to legal
ethics by way of recent developments in medical ethics.8 9 First, the
philosophical literature on confidentiality in the medical profession
provides a useful methodology for application of the "philosoph-
ically informed" approach in the legal profession. Second, the dis-
cussion of the confidentiality principle in the medical and legal
of this approach, Robert Veatch, argues that many of the traditional exceptions would be
agreed to because they involve "conditions in which the public might have an overwhelming
interest." R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 186. On the other hand, Veatch argues that reason-
able people would reject any rule that permitted disclosure whenever the information might
benefit society, because of the possible adverse effects of too much disclosure and because of
the value of privacy. Thus, Veatch concludes that although reasonable contractors would
probably not agree on the precise wording, the contractual pledge might well protect confi-
dentiality "except when there is a clearly identified, direct, immediate threat to life or grave
bodily harm to another." Id. at 187.
Treating the issue in an abstract manner, as Veatch does, it is difficult to consider how
interests which are less than substantial threats to life or grave bodily harm might outweigh
confidentiality in a particular case. However, by further specifying the reasoning process by
which the hypothetical contractors would determine the scope of permissible exceptions, and
by more closely examining the more concrete context within which such reasoning would
take place, harm which is substantial, but not immediately life-threatening, might fit within
an exception, particularly when the information to be revealed is not close to the "core self."
Cf. M. BAYLES, supra note 16, at 100-01 (to examine specific categories of cases, we should
identify all of the interests involved, and then consider how reasonable people imagining
themselves in each role would determine that some interests are worth sacrificing for the sake
of others). Bayles' approach has the advantage of considering patient interests other than
privacy-for example, financial security in the case of occupational hazards-as well as the
strength and intensity of both the patient's privacy interests and the various interests of
others which might be at stake.
89. See supra notes 14-19 and accompanying text.
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professions provides the basis for a potentially useful comparison of
the two professions and the role that confidentiality plays in each.
There is no apparent reason to distinguish lawyers from doctors
at the first stage of analysis-the initial justification for the obliga-
tion of confidentiality. Using either a utilitarian or a deontological
approach, it should be obvious that lawyers have, as do physicians,
at least a prima facie obligation to maintain client confidentiality.
Without such an obligation, clients might be deterred from the full
disclosure necessary for effective legal representation.90 Moreover,
the subject matter of lawyer-client communications (and other in-
formation) is just as private as those involved in the physician-pa-
tient relationship. 91 Because the very nature of a prima facie
90. See, eg., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-1 (1983); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6 comment (1983).
The utilitarian justification for the prima fade obligation of confidentiality in medical
ethics is discussed supra notes 52-59 and accompanying text.
91. See supra notes 60-67 and accompanying text (deontological justification for prima
facie obligation of confidentiality in medical ethics). Obviously, communications relating to
shameful criminal or tortious acts and all aspects of domestic relations are highly personal in
nature and thus very close to the "core self." See supra note 66 and accompanying text. The
strong privacy interest Americans typically assert in matters relating to income and other
financial matters is, perhaps, less obvious. See e.g., A. WESrIN, PRiVACY AND FREEDOM 53
(1967) (areas of highest resistance to survey questioning include "income and money"). As
with information about patients, see supra note 66 and accompanying text, not all informa-
tion about clients is at or close to the "core self." The strength of the various privacy inter-
ests at stake may well be a factor in determining when disclosure is morally appropriate. See
id.; infra notes 188, 258-59, 269-71 and accompanying text.
While the recognition of a prima facie obligation of confidentiality to individual clients
appears to be unproblematic, the recognition of a similar obligation to corporate clients raises
some troublesome questions. For example, using utilitarian theory, some commentators sug-
gest that given the realities of corporate existence (at least those of large corporations), it is
unlikely that the absence of a duty of confidentiality would have any substantial effect on
lawyer-client communications. See, eg., D. Luban, Corporate Counsel and Confidentiality
31-32 (1981) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Case Western Reserve Law Review);
cf. Note, The Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules Balancing and Constitutional Entitle-
ment, 91 HARv. L. REv. 464, 473-77 (1977) (more flexible balancing of interests would disfa-
vor absolute rule of evidentiary privilege for corporations, in part because corporations are
unlikely to stop using lawyers even if their communications are not afforded stringent protec-
tion). Even more problematic is how a deontological theory of privacy rights- grounded in
respect for human dignity--can apply to corporations and other abstract entities which are
not human. See, eg., D. Luban, supra, at 33-34 (finding additional support in the Supreme
Court's decision that corporations have no fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion); Gardner, A Personal Privilege for Communications of Corporate Clients-Paradox or
Public Policy?, 40 U. DET. L.J. 299, 312 (1963) (corporate evidentiary privilege cannot be
justified by social interest in individual life, as in case of individual clients); see also Lowell,
Corporate Privacy: A Remedy for the Victim of Industrial Espionage, 1971 DUKE L.J. 391
(summary of legal rules recognizing and denying various asserted privacy interests of corpo-
rations). Perhaps the most fruitful approach would be to invoke social contract theory, see
supra note 61, under which the extraction of corporate promises to recognize moral duties to
others (including society, employees and even the lawyers themselves) would require recogni-
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obligation is that it is not absolute, but may give way in light of
other substantial interests, 92 the recognition of such an obligation in
the lawyer-client relationship should be uncontroversial.
Differences between the legal and medical professions begin to
assume a greater significance at the second stage of the analysis-
defining the limits of the professional obligation of confidentiality.
For example, there are objective differences in both function and
circumstance which cannot be ignored, including the lawyer's
unique role in adversary litigation93 and the frequency with which
client interests conflict with the interests of others.94 In addition,
there are more subtle differences in professional attitudes toward
confidentiality, including the lawyers' heavy reliance on what they
see as a strong "tradition" of confidentiality, 95 embodied in the tes-
timonial privilege for attorney-client communications. 96 These dif-
ferences may present obstacles to the success of the philosophical
approach. Consequently, they need to be briefly discussed at the
outset, beginning with some unique and unfortunate aspects of the
historical development of confidentiality within the legal profession.
1. Differences in Historical Development: The Influence of the
Testimonial Privilege
Like the principle of physician-patient confidentiality,97 the con-
cept of attorney-client confidentiality had its origins in the obliga-
tions of honor among gentlemen.98 However, unlike the medical
tion by others of certain rights of the corporation, including some right to corporate confiden-
tiality. Cf. Bowie, The Moral Contract Between Employer and Employee, in ETHICAL
THEORY AND BUSINESS 150 (2d ed. 1983) (recognition of contractual rights and duties pre-
supposes recognition of all contractual parties as responsible, autonomous moral agents with
rights that can be pressed as claims against others). Of course, even assuming that a prima
facie obligation toward corporate clients can be justified, there may be reasons for distinguish-
ing between corporations and individuals in determining the limits to that obligation in vari-
ous situations. Cf. S. BOK, supra note 67, at 150-51 (in case of individual's personal affairs,
presumption should be in favor of maintaining privacy; in case of corporate and other collec-
tive secrets, presumption should be reversed). Given the complexities of the problem, this
Article will not attempt to address the particular issues raised by corporate clients but will
instead treat all clients as if they were individuals. Obviously, the problem of corporate cli-
ents needs to be addressed further, and additional philosophical analysis may help do so.
92. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
93. See infra notes 121-43 and accompanying text.
94. See infra notes 144-45 and accompanying text.
95. Hazard, supra note I, at 1069.
96. See infra notes 97-120 and accompanying text. As Professor Hazard convincingly
demonstrates, this strong "tradition" is not nearly so strong as attorneys generally believe,
even with respect to the evidentiary privilege itself. See Hazard, supra note 1.
97. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text.
98. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2290 (the theory of the attorney-client privilege
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principle, the legal principle did not originate in a professional code
of ethics, but rather in a rule of law: the testimonial privilege for
confidential communications between attorney and client.99 The at-
torney-client privilege, first recognized in late sixteenth century
England,"ic subsequently became the foundation for the confidenti-
ality provisions of the various ethics codes, which originated at a
much later date.101 Of course, the evidentiary rule applies only to
testimonial disclosures in judicial proceedings,"0 2 whereas the code
provisions clearly intend the rule of confidentiality to apply to all
phases of legal representation.10 3 Moreover, the evidentiary rule
protects only confidential communications," ° whereas the code
provisions address both confidential communications and other
"was very different from modem times. It was ... a consideration for the oath and the
honor of the attorney rather than for the apprehensions of his client.").
99. See generally 8 1. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2290-2329.
100. See id. § 2290. Under Roman law, the attorney was also excluded from giving testi-
mony. This exclusion, which also applied to family members and servants, was based on the
duty of loyalty. Radin, The Privilege of Confidential Communication Between Lawyer and
Client, 16 CALIF. L. REv. 487,488 (1928). The influence of the Roman tradition on the early
English doctrine of attorney-client privilege is unclear. Id. at 489.
101. The first codification of standards of ethics in the United States was adopted by the
Alabama State Bar in 1887. H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHics 23 (1953). The original Canons of
Ethics of the American Bar Association, adopted in 1908, contained but a passing reference
to confidentiality. Id. at 24. Canon 6 provided that the obligation of the attorney not to
reveal a client's confidences and secrets also forbade accepting a subsequent retainer in ad-
verse matters. CANONS OF ETHIcs Canbn 6 (1908). The first full-blown provision on confi-
dentiality, Canon 37, was not adopted until 1928, H. DRINKER, supra, at 309 n.1, 322 n.12,
and even then was viewed as embodying the testimonial privilege under common law. See
ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 287 (1953); see also H.
DRINKER, supra, at 131-32 (rule of Canon 37 "has long been a rule of the common law" and
thus "its application is usually a question of law rather than of ethics").
102. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2324. Some commentators argue that the attor-
ney-client privilege extends to non-testimonial situations. Eg., Callan & David, supra note
13, at 340 n.40. However, these commentators base their arguments on a line of cases which
involves fraudulent activity by the attorney rather than the client. See Note, Client Fraud
and the Lawyer-An EthicalAnalysis, 62 MINN. L. REv. 89, 112-13 n.104 (1977).
103. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 4-101(B) (1983) ("a lawyer
shall not knowingly . . . reveal a confidence or secret of his client"); MODEL RULES OF
PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1983) ("[a] lawyer shall not reveal information relat-
ing to representation of a client"); The Model Code further provides:
"Confidence" refers to information protected by the attorney-client privilege under
applicable law, and "secret" refers to other information gained in the professional
relationship that the client has requested be held inviolate or the disclosure of which
would be embarrassing or would be likely to be detrimental to the client.
Id. DR 4-101(A). The earlier Canons also applied the ethical rule of confidentiality to all
phases of legal representation. See H. DRINKER, supra note 101, at 131-39. Canon 37 ap-
plied only to confidential communications; however, Canon 6 imposed an additional duty not
to divulge other client secrets. See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
Formal Op. 287 (1953).
104. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, §§ 2306-2320.
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"secrets."' 0 5 Nonetheless, even the broader scope of the code pro-
visions was not derived from ethics, but from another rule of law:
the law of agency and the confidentiality obligations which arise
from fiduciary relationships generally.'
0 6
It is not surprising that lawyers have turned to law as a source
for defining their professional obligations. However, it is surprising,
as well as unfortunate, that it was the narrow rule of testimonial
privilege, and not the broader, more flexible law of agency,10 7 that
had the dominant influence on the development of confidentiality in
the legal profession. Moreover, what is unfortunate is not that the
code provisions track the attorney-client privilege-indeed, they do
not-but rather that after extending the prima facie obligation well
beyond the scope of the testimonial privilege,01 the profession con-
tinues to look to the law of evidence as a primary source for defining
the limits of that obligation.
A recent opinion of the American Bar Association's Committee
on Ethics and Professional Responsibility offers a good illustration
of the dangers of attempting to transfer the narrow law of evidence
to the extended universe of ethics. In this opinion,'0 9 the Commit-
105. See supra note 103.
106. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 legal background (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981).
107. Compare 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2298 (primary evidentiary exception lim-
ited to communications intended to further a future crime or fraud) with RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 395 comment f (agent may reveal confidential information to protect
a superior interest of himself or of a third person). The scope of permissible disclosure under
agency law is by no means clear. Compare D. Luban, supra note 91, at 44 & n.67 (comment f
would have supported Ford Motor Co.'s lawyer disclosing dangerous design of Pinto gas
tank, regardless whether or not criminal conduct was involved) with Blumberg, Corporate
Responsibility and the Employee's Duty of Loyalty and Obedience: A Preliminary Inquiry, 24
OKLA. L. REv. 279, 286-87 (1971) (comment f refers only to commission of a crime). There
are precedents in related areas which suggest that disclosure beyond intended crimes or
frauds might well be permitted. See generally Note, Action for Breach of Medical Secrecy
Outside the Courtroom, 36 U. CINN. L. REv. 103, 114-15 (1967) (discussion of cases denying
recovery against physician for breach of confidentiality when disclosure justified by general
public health and welfare). See also Luban, supra note 16, at 11 ("agency theory in its mod-
em form imposes more ethical limitations on the 'rule of undivided loyalty' than does [proce-
dural theory focusing on the lawyer's role in the adversary system]").
Interestingly, while lawyers tend to rely on law in fashioning their own ethical obliga-
tions, they sometimes defer to professional ethics in determining the application of law to
other professionals. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 385(1) comment a ("[i]n
determining whether or not the orders of the principal to the agent are reasonable [and,
therefore, must be obeyed] . . .business or professional ethics. . . are considered"); see also
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58, 74-76, 417 A.2d 505, 513-14 (1980) (em-
ployer may not fire employee at will on basis of refusal to engage in conduct that would
constitute a clear violation of a code of professional ethics).
108. See supra notes 102-05 and accompanying text.
109. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
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tee refused to permit the disclosure of nonprivileged matter which
established past client fraud. In reaching its conclusion, the Com-
mittee reasoned that the evidentiary privilege reflects a "tradition"
in which the value of confidentiality "should take precedence" over
other interests in "all but the most serious cases";110 for example,
those cases involving communications in furtherance of a future
crime or fraud, which fall under an exception to the evidentiary
privilege.' This opinion reflects a serious failure to understand
precisely what narrow "values" are embodied in the evidentiary
privilege, and, more particularly, in its most significant exception,
the future crime or fraud exception.
First, the sole question with respect to the testimonial privilege
is whether to receive the relevant testimony of a lawyer, thereby
furthering the interest of courts and litigants in promoting an accu-
rate verdict. Since the future crime or fraud exception applies even
in nonrelated proceedings,"' it is clear that under the law of evi-
dence it was not designed to prevent the occurrence of the crime or
fraud in question, nor to ensure redress for the innocent victim. In
fact, the future crime or fraud exception to the attorney-client privi-
lege does not represent the product of any balancing of a client's
interest in confidentiality against other possible interests, despite the
Committee's suggestion of such a "tradition." Rather, the underly-
ing rationale is that communications in furtherance of a crime or
fraud are not made to a lawyer acting in his professional capacity,
and thus are not even within the ambit of the privilege.1 3
110. Id.
111. See id. The Committee refers to DR 4-101(C)(3) of the ABA Model Code, however,
it is clear that DR 4-101(C)(3) is itself based on the law of attorney-client privilege. See
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 178 (Am. B. Found. 1979).
Under the laws of evidence, the traditional exception clearly includes both crimes and
frauds. See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2298; Gardner, The Crime or Fraud
Exception to the Attorney-Client Privilege, 47 A.B.A. J. 708 (1961); Note, The Future Crime
or Tort Exception to Communications Privilege, 77 HARv. L. REv. 730 (1964). While DR 4-
101(C)(3) refers only to crimes, there is good reason to believe that the term "crime" was
intended as a term of art, taken from former Canon 37, which includes both crimes and
frauds. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 legal background (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981).
112. See, eg., Gardner, supra note 111, at 709.
113. See Regina v. Cox, 14 Q.B.D. 153, 168 (1884):
In order that the rule may apply there must be both professional confidence and
professional employment, but if the client has a criminal object in view in his com-
munications with his solicitor one of these elements must necessarily be absent. The
client must either conspire with his solicitor or deceive him. If his criminal object is
avowed, the client does not consult his adviser professionally, because it cannot be
the solicitor's business to further any criminal object. If the client does not avow his
object, he reposes no confidence, for the state of facts, which is the foundation of
the supposed confidence, does not exist. The solicitor's advice is obtained by fraud.
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Second, and perhaps more important, the limited balancing of
interests that did result in the adoption of a broad testimonial privi-
lege for confidential communications between attorney and client is
not readily extended beyond the context of testimonial disclosures.
The standard utilitarian justification for the privilege is that if cli-
ents fear their attorneys will be permitted or compelled to testify
against them in court, they will hesitate to disclose the facts neces-
sary for effective representation.114 This rationale is applied to "in-
nocent" as well as "guilty" clients because the former may be either
unsure of the justice of their cause' " or simply prone to faulty rec-
ollection in their initial presentation of the facts.116 While the evi-
dentiary privilege is not without its critics,117 the possibility of
routine depositions of attorneys, even if only conducted to discover
inconsistencies in their clients' statements, is an appalling prospect,
on both utilitarian and privacy grounds.1 18 Moreover, because the
only interest opposed to confidentialty in this context is the interest
of courts and litigants in obtaining relevant evidence, the usual
availability of the same information from other sources, including
the client, substantially reduces the number of cases in which an
attorney's testimony would be critical.119
These same considerations do not necessarily apply in other
contexts. Clearly, "innocent" clients have less to fear when disclo-
sure is permitted, or even compelled, on the basis of professional
standards rather than on the whim of an adversary or the attorney
himself. This is particularly true when these standards are invoked
only in specific and well-defined situations and, in some cases, only
after the client has been given an opportunity to avoid disclosure by
correcting the underlying problem. 2° Even if some undesired de-
terrence does result in these contexts, the need to consider interests
See generally 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2298; Gardner, supra note 111, at 709; Note,
supra note 111, at 731.
114. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2291.
115. See id.
116. Cf. Gardner, A Re-Evaluation of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pt. 1), 8 VILL. L.
Rav. 279, 323 (1963) ("It is well recognized by those who work with factual details that the
memory of man is an inaccurate instrument when it comes to the recollection of details of
past events.").
117. For critical discussions of the attorney-client privilege, see Gardner, A Re-Evalua-
tion of the Attorney-Client Privilege (pts. 1 & 2), 8 VILL. L. REv. 279, 447 (1963); Note, The
Attorney-Client Privilege: Fixed Rules, Balancing, and Constitutional Entitlement, 91 HARv.
L. REV. 464 (1977).
118. Cf. Gardner, supra note 116, at 324-26.
119. Cf id. at 325 (actual results in accuracy of fact presentation would not be substan-
tially better without the evidentiary privilege).
120. Moreover, when disclosure is permitted, rather than required, the attorney will have
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other than the narrow interest of courts and litigants in obtaining
relevant evidence will call for a far more sophisticated utilitarian
calculus than has previously been used in the law of evidence.
None of the above is meant to suggest that there will never be
situations in which the client's interest in confidentiality outweighs
the interests of others in avoiding harm, perhaps even serious
harm. The only conclusion to be drawn at this stage is that the
historical development of the principle of confidentiality has re-
suited in a misguided and undue emphasis on the testimonial privi-
lege, which has in turn led to the mistaken, but prevalent,
assumption that the law itself embodies a broad tradition where
confidentiality almost always takes precedence over other interests.
2. Differences in Function: Limits of the
"'Institutional Excuse" l"
Another important, and potentially distorting, influence on the
legal profession's perspective on confidentiality is the traditional fo-
cus on certain unique aspects of the lawyer's function. In response
to suggestions that lawyers should reveal adverse facts in litigation,
lawyers typically argue not merely that clients have a strong interest
in confidentiality, but also that our adversary system of justice re-
quires that the lawyer present only evidence favorable to his cli-
ent.12 2 Moreover, even in nonlitigation, any suggestion that lawyers
might reveal a client's intent to commit an immoral, but entirely
lawful act, will be met with the argument that, at least in a democ-
racy, the lawyer's special function in implementing the rule of law
requires strict noninterference with the exercise of client autonomy
within the limits of the law. 123
One way of justifying far greater disclosure than is presently
permitted under the Model Code is to challenge the standard con-
ception of the lawyer's role, which is perceived to entail at least
some degree of partisan zeal as well as moral neutrality. 124 This
approach, while raising a number of interesting questions, requires
an opportunity to consider the need for disclosure in light of any unique circumstances of the
particular case.
121. Luban, The Adversary System Excuse, in THE GOOD LAWYER 83, 85-87 (D. Luban
ed. 1983).
122. See infra notes 126-28 and accompanying text.
123. See infra notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
124. See A. GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 90-92; Luban, supra note 121, at 87-91;
Schwartz, The Professionalism and Accountability of Lawyers, 66 CALIF. L. RPV. 669, 672-75
(1978); Simon, The Ideology of Advocacy: Procedural Justice and Professional Ethics, 1978
Wis. L. REv. 29, 34-39.
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a far more radical revision of legal thought than may be necessary
to resolve some of the specific confidentiality issues that are pres-
ently being debated. Perhaps more importantly, this approach ap-
pears to concede that it is the lawyer's function that ultimately
determines the ethics of confidentiality and disclosure. 125  To the
contrary, this section will attempt to demonstrate that even if the
adversary system is itself justified, and even if the lawyer has at
least a prima facie obligation of moral neutrality, the implications of
the "institutional excuse" are far less extensive than lawyers typi-
cally assume.
a. The Advocate in the Adversary System. The adversary sys-
tem of litigation is characterized by three essential elements: an im-
partial tribunal, formal rules of procedure, and parties who are
assigned the responsibility for presenting their own best cases and
challenging the presentation of their opponents. 126 The primary
duty of the advocate in the adversary system is "one-sided partisan
zeal," 127 which is expected to produce, at least in the long run,
either protection of the individual against the power of the state (in
the case of criminal defendants) or factually and legally accurate
verdicts (in the case of civil plaintiffs and defendants).1 28  In this
scheme, the duty of confidentiality is but a "collateral duty"
designed to enhance the quality of partisan advocacy, under the
125. But cf. Luban, supra note 121, at 118 (adversary system and the system of profes-
sional obligation it mandates may be justified, but "when professional and moral obligation
conflict, moral obligation takes precedence"). This Article will not argue that personal mo-
rality may sometimes call for disobedience to generally justified professional norms, but
rather that the professional norms themselves should be shaped by moral considerations
other than, or in addition to, professional function. There is an additional reason why the
lawyer's function in society can never be a sufficient basis for resolving confidentiality dilem-
mas. Unlike physicians, who generally serve the single societal goal of improving the health
of individual patients, lawyers serve at least two, often conflicting goals-as individual client
representatives they must maximize client values, whereas, as "officers of the court" they
must ensure the proper functioning of the adversary legal system. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text. As long as there is tension between these two professional goals, lawyers
must necessarily look outside the profession to resolve at least those moral dilemmas which
arise as a result of such tension.
126. See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 672. For a more thorough and detailed discussion
of the adversary system, see generally Fuller, The Adversary System, in TALKS ON AMERICAN
LAW 34 (H. Berman ed. 1961).
127. Luban, supra note 121, at 90. This duty of partisan zeal is modified in the case of the
prosecutor, who is an "administrator of justice" as well as an advocate. STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 3-1.1(b) (1979). The role of the prosecutor is "to seek justice, not
merely to convict." Id. § 3-1.1(c).
128. See Luban, supra note 121, at 91-93. Obviously, it is the duty of the criminal defense
lawyer (and not the prosecutor) to protect the defendant against the power of the state. See
infra notes 169-70 and accompanying text (role of defense counsel in protecting constitutional
rights of criminal defendant). Combining the duties of both prosecutor and defense counsel,
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utilitarian assumption (borrowed from the law of evidence) that
confidentiality encourages clients to give lawyers the information
necessary for effective advocacy.129
Keeping in mind the subordinate position of the duty of confi-
dentiality, it should be obvious that the critical questions under the
adversary system are not what limits should be placed on confiden-
tiality, but rather what limits should be placed on partisan zeal in
order that the various goals of the adversary system may be best
achieved. There are already a number of well-accepted limitations
on advocacy-for example, rules which prohibit a lawyer from ly-
ing,130 from counseling or assisting clients in crimes and frauds, 13
and, in civil cases, from violating rules requiring truthful plead-
ing132 and compliance with extensive discovery requests. 133 These
limitations may well have the effect of deterring clients, even "inno-
cent" clients, from full disclosure, 34 but they have been determined
to be justifiable nonetheless.
supra note 127 and accompanying text, the goal of the criminal justice system is to convict
those guilty of crimes without violating their constitutional rights.
As for civil trials, there are those who disagree that the goal of the adversary system is
"truth." See, eg., Luban, supra note 121, at 97-111 (summary and criticism of various alter-
native goals). Nonetheless, this Article will assume that "truth," in the sense of legally and
factually accurate verdicts, is at least the primary goal of modem civil litigation. This as-
sumption recognizes that there are particular instances in which either the substantive law or
the procedural rules themselves embody a judgment that some values are more important
than truth. See Wolfram, Client Perjury: The Kutak Commission and the Association of Trial
Lawyers on Lawyers Lying Clients, and the Adversary System, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RE-
SEARCH J. 921, 976 [hereinafter cited as Wolfram, Client Perjury I1] (value of finality over-
rides truth in laws prohibiting suits for libel or malicious prosecution based on allegations of
perjury in prior litigation). For an argument why truth and not the preservation of "human
dignity" is the primary goal of the adversary system of civil litigation, see infra notes 172-75
and accompanying text.
This Article will further assume that the goal of truth is sufficiently met in civil litigation
to justify retention of the adversary system. This second assumption is even more controver-
sial than the first. See Luban, supra note 121, at 93-97. The purpose of this Article is to
demonstrate that even if the adversary system is justified on the grounds that it promotes
truth in the vast majority of cases, the attorney's duty of confidentiality need not be as strong
as defenders of the adversary system have urged that it must be.
129. See Luban, supra note 121, at 90.
130. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(5) (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(1) (1983).
131. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1983),
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
132. See FED. R. Cwy. P. 11 (attorney subject to possible disciplinary action for willful
violation of requirement that he sign pleading certifying "that to best of his knowledge, infor-
mation, and belief there is good ground to support it").
133. See FED. R. Cwy. P. 26-37; MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrrY DR
7-102(A)(3) (1983); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(a),(d) (1983).
134. See infra note 180 and accompanying text.
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Once these specific limitations on partisan zeal are accepted,
lawyers can no longer automatically invoke the duty of confidential-
ity in every situation in which clients might be deterred from disclo-
sure. Rather, lawyers must first consider the possibility of
deterrence beyond that which is already contemplated, and second,
the extent to which such additional deterrence would have a signifi-
cant adverse impact on the values implicit in the adversary system.
Similarly, under a privacy perspective, lawyers must first take into
account the extent to which the client's right to privacy has already
been infringed by the recognized limits on partisan zeal before con-
cluding that further infringements are unjustified.
b. The Nonadvocate Lawyer. In litigation, the duty of partisan
zeal exists (and for the purposes of this discussion is assumed to be
justified) within the context of the adversary system itself. At least
in theory, the presence of a neutral arbitrator and an equally parti-
san opponent is thought "to provide maximum opportunity to re-
solve disputes fairly, correctly, efficiently, and promptly."13 In
nonlitigation, however, there are no comparable assurances that
partisan zeal, even in the long run, will lead to just results in most
cases. Nonetheless, the standard conception of the nonadvocate
lawyer's role requires, or at least permits,136 partisan zeal with only
minimal limitations, most significantly the prohibition on counsel-
ing or assisting clients in activities known to be criminal or fraudu-
lent.137 While there is no standard justification of partisan zeal in
these circumstances, the usual argument (typically articulated by its
critics) is that if lawyers were to refuse on moral grounds to pursue
that to which their clients have legal rights, they "would assume the
power to determine the scope of legal rights themselves' 134-a re-
135. Schwartz, supra note 124, at 674. See also id. at 677 ("faith in the ability of the
arbiter to reach a correct decision [justifies putting] one's best foot forward by stepping on the
feet of the other side").
136. See id. at 679-80. In reliance on EC 7-8 (lawyer may withdraw when "the client in a
non-adjudicatory matter insists upon a course of conduct that is contrary to the judgment
and advice of the lawyer") and EC 7-9 (lawyer may ask his client for permission to forego an
action which the lawyer regards as unjust), Professor Schwartz concludes that a non-advo-
cate lawyer always has the option of refusing to exercise partisan zeal. See id. at 680. How-
ever, because DR 2-110(A)(2) forbids a lawyer from withdrawing (on permissive grounds)
when to do so would prejudice the (legal) rights of his client, there may be circumstances
when a lawyer is required to exercise partisan zeal, contrary to his personal inclinations. See
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL REsPONSIBILrrY DR 2-1 10(A)(2) (1983). Moreover, while
a lawyer may initially decline employment for moral or any other reasons, the traditional
view is that no client should fail to obtain fully partisan representation solely by reason of a
morally (but not legally) objectionable claim. See id. EC 2-26.
137. See Schwartz, supra note 124, at 679 n.18.
138. A. GOLDMAN, supra note 16, at 111-12.
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suit which is both undemocratic and in violation of the client's right
to autonomy within the law.13 9
In a society that has a strong commitment both to the rule of
law and to social and moral diversity," perhaps lawyers ought not
routinely to refuse assistance to those with whom they disagree on
moral, as opposed to legal, grounds. Nonetheless, the implications
of adopting a prima facie obligation of moral neutrality are far from
clear. First, additional arguments would be needed to justify an ab-
solute obligation, since the individual's moral right to autonomy
outside the legal sphere is typically thought to give way to the rights
of others in at least some cases. 141 Second, it is by no means obvi-
ous that restrictions on confidentiality necessarily infringe on the
client's autonomy in ways that are unjustifiable, particularly when
the right to privacy is seen as but one component of a broader right
to self-determination. 42 Finally, recognition of a client's right to
autonomy within the law only suggests that lawyers ought not inter-
fere unless the client intends an act which he has no legal right to
do, and such acts are by no means limited to crimes and frauds. 143
139. Id. at 107, 111-12. See also Fried, supra note 18, at 1073 (social and legal nexus is
"so complex that without the assistance of an expert advisor an ordinary layman cannot
exercise that autonomy which the system must allow him"); Schwartz, supra note 124, at 685
("danger of imposing the standards of an elite upon segments of the population that are not
fairly represented at the bar").
140. See Donagan, Justifying Legal Practice in the Adversary System, in THE GOOD LAW-
YER 123, 128 (D. Luban ed. 1983).
141. See J. RAwLs, supra note 61, at 60 (although the principle of liberty is the first
principle of a contractual system, an individual has a right only to "the most extensive basic
liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others") (emphasis added). If autonomy is viewed
as synonymous with liberty, then clearly no one has an absolute right to autonomy, i.e., to do
as he pleases. However, there is another view which treats respect for the rights of others as
inherent in the autonomy principle itself. See Donagan, supra note 140, at 129 (principle
requires "some process of rational reflection" leading to the individual's own conclusion that
the proposed conduct is "morally permissible"). Under this view, respecting the dignity of
autonomous human beings clearly does not require (or even permit) partisan zeal on behalf of
clients whose moral opinions are either insincere or rationally indefensible. Id. at 129-33.
142. See supra note 65 and accompanying text. Disclosure of a client's intent to commit
an immoral (but lawful) act does not, in itself, prevent the client from committing the act. In
some cases, the lawyer may disclose or threaten to disclose simply in the expectation that
adverse publicity or the threat thereof will cause the client to change his mind.
Of course, if clients have privacy rights that are entirely independent of their liberty
rights, then disclosure might be morally impermissible. See Rosenfeld, supra note 18, at 510.
If so, however, it is not because disclosure necessarily violates the client's right to "autonomy
within the law." For a fuller discussion of the privacy rights of clients when the act proposed
is immoral but not clearly illegal, see infra notes 250-61 and accompanying text.
143. For example, while a client has a legal right to will his property in accordance with
the law, he has no legal right to commit an intentional tort; nor is he even legally "free" to
commit such a tort, in the sense that it would be wrong for others to interfere with his liberty
in order to prevent him from doing so. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 18, at 510-11 (distinction
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Similarly, the obligation of moral neutrality alone cannot explain
why disclosure is presently limited to future crimes and frauds and
has not been broadened to include at least some past actions, partic-
ularly those in which the lawyer himself participated as an unwit-
ting accomplice. 144
Like the discussion in the previous section on confidentiality and
the attorney-client privilege, none of the above is meant to suggest
that the lawyer's unique functions, coupled with our strong com-
mitment to law and legal institutions, will never result in special
treatment of specific confidentiality issues. The point is simply that
these functions, even if generally justifiable, do not necessarily re-
solve all, or even most, confidentiality issues without reference to
the broader moral framework within which lawyers (and legal insti-
tutions) play their roles.
3. Differences in Circumstances: Frequency of Conflict and
Frustration of the Professional Objective
There are additional characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from the medical (and other) professions- specifically,
those pertaining to the circumstances in which confidentiality is-
sues typically arise. These characteristics include: first, the fre-
quency of conflict between a client's interests and the interests of
others; and second, the fact that disclosure (or even withdrawal)
often frustrates the very objectives of the specific legal consulta-
tion.145 While the existence of these unique aspects of the legal
profession is uncontroversial, their significance clearly is not.
From our initial survey of the ethics of confidentiality in the
medical profession, it should be obvious that situations in which
between "negative rights" and "negative freedoms"). For a discussion of other reasons why
the ethical restraints on lawyers assisting unlawful client conduct are presently limited to
crimes and frauds, see infra notes 234-37 and accompanying text.
144. See infra notes 262-65 and accompanying text.
145. See infra notes 147-48 and accompanying text. A third distinguishing characteristic
might be the extent to which lawyers themselves are used in the course of (or make possible)
harm done by their clients to others. See infra notes 289-98 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing propriety of disclosure when lawyer has participated in client's past wrongdoing).
One commentator suggests that the most important difference between doctors and law-
yers is that lawyers "represent" (that is, act "instead of") their clients in ways that doctors do
not. Rosenfeld, supra note 18, at 486. This distinction merely suggests that attorneys should
not be subject to legal restraints to which their clients are not similarly subject. It by no
means supports the traditional notion that attorneys can escape moral blame in all situations
where their clients cannot. Attorneys can only escape moral blame in situations when such
"moral neutrality" is necessary to protect the client's autonomy within the law. See supra
notes 136-39 and accompanying text.
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disclosure by a physician is necessary to prevent harm to others will
be relatively rare. Thus, an ethical requirement that physicians
have concern for the interests of others should not have any sub-
stantial effect on their day-to-day efforts on behalf of patients. Even
in the atypical case in which a patient does pose a danger to others
and disclosure is warranted, such disclosure does not necessarily
prevent the physician from continuing to treat the patient just as he
would have if no disclosure had been made.146 The physician may
feel that he has "betrayed" the patient, but not in the sense of hav-
ing betrayed the very objectives of the professional consultation.
The lawyer's situation is clearly different. In litigation, there is
always an opponent whose interests conflict with those of the client.
In nonlitigation, even if there is not an actual or potential adver-
sary, there is at least the likelihood that the client's proposed activ-
ity will have an adverse impact on others. As a result, an ethical
requirement that lawyers have equal (or even meaningful) concern
for others could significantly interfere with the ability of clients to
secure effective representation, as well as put the lawyer in the
unenviable position of constant stress and uncertainty.147 More-
over, unlike the physician, the lawyer who discloses a client's confi-
dence, or alternatively withdraws, almost inevitably frustrates the
specific objectives of the legal consultation, thus raising the spectre
of "betrayal" in its most powerful sense.
1 48
Interestingly, there is an analogous conflict in medical ethics but
it does not involve the duty of confidentiality. The issue concerns
the individual physician's role in promoting distributive justice-
that is, the allocation of health resources. Specifically, the question
is whether physicians ought to be more conscious of cost contain-
ment for the benefit of society when they recommend particular
procedures for their patients. 49 Many philosophers argue that phy-
sicians ought to be exempted from the duties of an ordinary citizen
146. The most obvious exception would be the psychotherapist-patient relationship in
which disclosure may threaten the success of the psychotherapist's efforts, even if the patient
chooses to remain in therapy. See supra note 57.
147. Cf. 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2298 ("the legal adviser must not habitually be
placed in the position of an informer"). Tension would result from a lawyer's understandable
reluctance to take action detrimental to a client, as well as from the difficulty of knowing
when disclosure would be morally appropriate, given, in many cases, the lawyer's limited
knowledge of the morally relevant circumstances.
148. Cf id. § 2291 (discussing considerations of "treachery" when attorney is forced to
testify against his own client). Thus, while disclosure does not necessarily prevent the client
from carrying out his plan, see supra note 141 and accompanying text, it will almost invaria-
bly prevent the lawyer from fulfilling the function for which he was employed.
149. See H. BRODY, supra note 67, at 213-30.
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because, as Professor Veatch suggests, "if the physician routinely
took it upon himself or herself to solve the problems of health re-
source allocation, that physician might be immobilized and might
so abandon the patient perspective that patient care would suffer
seriously." 150
In view of the frequency of conflict between client interests and
the interests of others, and the extent to which disclosure will frus-
trate the very objectives of the lawyer-client relationship, a similar
argument can be made that if lawyers routinely considered the in-
terests of others (or the interest of society as a whole), they would
be immobilized and client care would suffer seriously. While this
argument may be valid, it does not necessarily support any stronger
duty of confidentiality than that already supported by the adversary
system and by the concept of client autonomy within the law. 151
Even Professor Veatch, who argues that a physician ought to give
preference to the patient's interest over those of society, concedes
that there will be unavoidable "extreme situations" in which justice
"overwhelmingly requires" the physician to abandon the patient
perspective. 152
Moreover, differences between the legal and medical professions
suggest that the analogy is not entirely apposite. Arguably, one
reason why physicians need not place cost containment on their
agenda is because it "should be on someone else's agenda."' 153
Thus, it is assumed that government officials and other bureaucrats
will address the broader social issues and that they are more compe-
tent to do so. While there are sometimes similar checks on the indi-
vidual client in the legal context-for example, when the adversary
has equal resources and is represented by equally competent coun-
sel- there are numerous situations in which, absent disclosure by
the lawyer, no one is in a position to prevent or correct the harm
threatened by a client.
In addition, the failure of physicians to consider cost contain-
ment or other distributional concerns does not typically have a di-
rect and immediate effect on other individuals, and when it does, an
"extreme situation" may be presented requiring the abandonment
of the primary patient.1 4 Such emergencies may arise more fre-
150. R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 281. Accord T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra
note 45, at 160-68.
151. See supra notes 189-210 and accompanying text.
152. R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 287.
153. Id. at 285.
154. Compare H. BRODY, supra note 67, at 230 (physician should not recommend against
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quently in the context of the lawyer-client relationship, but perhaps
they will not arise so frequently that the "relationship of personal
care and trust would be radically altered."' 155
In summary then, the frequency of conflict between clients and
others argues against any requirement that lawyers routinely be
concerned with the possible adverse effects of proposed client con-
duct on the interests of others. Nonetheless, at least in situations in
which the harm threatened is direct and immediate, and in which
there is no reason to believe that the problem is sufficiently "on
someone else's agenda," permitting disclosure by lawyers does not
necessarily mean the destruction of the client-centered perspective.
Rather, confidentiality and disclosure dilemmas should be consid-
ered in the specific context in which they arise, with reference to the
broader principles of utility and privacy.
B. Limits on the Prima Facie Obligation: Litigation
Having cleared away a few of the potential obstacles to the phil-
osophical approach, it is now time to address at least some of the
specific confidentiality issues which are currently confronting the
legal profession. In litigation, these issues concern increased disclo-
sure for the purpose of promoting verdicts in accordance with facts
known by the lawyer. Thus, it has been proposed that lawyers be
either required to, or permitted to, reveal adverse facts not known
by the court or the opponent. In addition, it has been proposed that
lawyers be required to report client perjury.
1. Disclosure of Adverse Facts
The present controversy surrounding lawyer disclosure* of ad-
verse facts was sparked by an article published in 1975 by then
Judge Marvin Frankel.156 In that article, Judge Frankel concluded:
first, the paramount objective of the adversary system is "truth,"
second, the search for truth fails too much of the time, and, third,
the adversary system can only achieve its primary goal by requiring
lawyers to directly pursue truth, as opposed to victory, for their
clients.'5 7 Among the controversial provisions of Judge Frankel's
"draft" proposal was one which called for the routine disclosure of
bone marrow transplant solely because other unknown persons might be disadvantaged) with
R. VEATCH, supra note 20, at 286 (physician should abandon patient receiving routine physi-
cal in order to assist a non-patient bleeding to death from an automobile accident).
155. T. BEAUCHAMP & J. CHILDRESS, supra note 45, at 213.
156. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 123 U. PA. L. REv. 1031 (1975).
157. Id. at 1031-52.
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relevant evidence or witnesses not being offered by the lawyer on his
own client's behalf.' 8
If the adversary system of litigation is justified-and it is as-
sumed here that it is-then Judge Frankel's proposal must be re-
jected. It eliminates one of the three essential elements of that
system-assignment to the parties of the responsibility of presenting
their own best cases and challenging the presentation of their oppo-
nents,' 59 it also eliminates the advocate's primary duty of partisan
zeal, which is clearly incompatible with Frankel's duty to directly
pursue truth in all cases. 160 While we might agree with Judge Fran-
kel that the search for truth fails too much of the time, we must
assume (if the adversary system is justified) 161 that it is not the ad-
versary model itself which is to blame, but rather improper excesses
of partisan zeal. 162 As Professor Uviller notes, a number of abuses
might be eliminated without altering the core of the adversary sys-
tem-that is, "the juxtaposition of two contrary perspectives, the
impact of challenge and counter-proof [that] often discloses to a
neutral intelligence the most likely structure of Truth."'' 63
Nonetheless, even if all these abuses were eliminated, it might
still happen that in a small minority of cases, the failure of a lawyer
to disclose a known fact would result in an inaccurate verdict. This
possibility certainly is not incompatible with the assumption that
the adversary system is justified, since no system realistically could
be expected to produce accurate verdicts in all cases. The question
still remains whether disclosure in this small minority of cases
might be justified, given that similar departure from the norms of
party presentation and partisan zeal would not occur in the vast
158. Id. at 1057.
159. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
160. See supra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
161. As noted previously, this Article is assuming that truth is indeed the primary goal of
the adversary system (in civil litigation) and that the adversary system is justified on the
ground that it will (or can) promote truth in the vast majority of cases, if the appropriate
limits on partisan zeal are adhered to. See supra note 128. Of course, while truth is an
important goal in criminal trials, it is not necessarily the primary goal, given the need to
protect the defendant's constitutional rights. See id.; infra notes 168-71 and accompanying
text.
162. See Uviller, The Advocate, the Truth and Judicial Hackles: A Reaction to Judge
Frankel's Idea, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 1067 passim (1975). Other commentators have urged
retention of the adversary system of litigation, but with reforms in civil and criminal proce-
dure which are designed to enhance the truth-seeking function of trials while protecting the
rights of the parties. See J. FRANK, COURTS ON TRIAL: MYTH AND REALITY IN AMERICAN
JUSTICE 80-102 (1949); Golding, On the Adversary System and Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
LAW 98 (R. Bronaugh ed. 1978).
163. Uviller, supra note 162, at 1067.
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majority of cases and threaten the successful functioning of the ad-
versary system. 164
An early draft of the Model Rules contained a proposal
designed to cover precisely these cases. In a section entitled "Can-
dor Toward the Tribunal," the draft provided that in a civil case a
lawyer shall not "fail to disclose a fact, even if the fact is adverse,"
when "[d]isclosure of the fact would probably have a substantial
effect on the determination of a material issue of fact."1
65 This draft
provision was eliminated prior to submission to the ABA House of
Delegates, though it is not immediately clear why it was unaccept-
able, other than for the reason frankly given by the Commission
itself-that it was contrary to the tradition of confidentiality in the
legal profession.166 To assess this tradition, it is necessary to ex-
amine other reasons offered in opposition to lawyer disclosure
under an adversary system of litigation.
One reason, given by Professor Freedman, is that while "truth"
is by no means irrelevant or unimportant, it is not the paramount
objective of the adversary system.' 67 According to Professor Freed-
man, that paramount objective is "respect for human dignity,"'1 68
which presumably would be violated by even occasional departures
from confidentiality. As applied to our present criminal justice sys-
tem, this statement is true (with the possible exception of disclosure
of client perjury) and relatively uncontroversial. 69 Human dignity
is preserved for the guilty as well as the innocent by requiring the
164. Cf. infra note 180 and accompanying text (Model Rules require departure from
norms in ex parte proceedings).
165. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2(a)(3)(iii) (Initial Draft 1979),
reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, Aug. 27, 1979, at 36, col. 1.
166. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.1 comment (Discussion
Draft 1980).
The Discussion Draft did contain a provision for the permissive disclosure of adverse
evidence (except in criminal cases). See id. Rule 3.1(e). However, this provision was deleted
in the Proposed Final Draft submitted to the ABA House of Delegates. See MODEL RULES
OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(c) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (permission limited to
refusing to offer evidence believed to be false).
167. M. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN ADVERSARY SYSTEM 3 (1975).
168. Id.
169. See Luban, supra note 121, at 91-93. As Luban notes, it is the public, not the legal
profession, that finds the ethics of defending guilty criminals to be "morally dubious." Thus,
the leading defenders of the adversary system often focus their justifications on criminal de-
fense. Id. at 91-92. While lawyers may disagree on the ethics of particular defense tactics, it
would be unusual for a lawyer to argue that "truth" is the paramount objective of the adver-
sary criminal trial, given the undisputed authority of constitutional protections designed to
maintain the dignity of the accused. See infra note 170 and accompanying text. For a discus-
sion of the ethics of disclosing client perjury in a criminal trial, see infra notes 201-10 and
accompanying text.
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state to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt by introducing le-
gally admissible evidence, without coercing assistance from either
the defendant or his lawyer. 7 ' In light of this important objective
of the criminal justice system, any disclosure of adverse facts by a
criminal defendant's lawyer would be clearly unjustified, and thus
was not required, or even permitted in the draft proposal.1 7
When applied to civil cases, however, there is little reason to
accede to the suggestion that "human dignity" and not "truth" is
the paramount objective of the adversary system.1 72 One need only
look at the rules of civil procedure-those "formal rules of proce-
dure" that constitute the second essential element of the adversary
system M-to recognize that "truth" is indeed the dominant goal.
These rules require truthful pleading and liberal discovery of rele-
vant information, including discovery from the client himself.174
Given the explicit language of these rules, which differ so signifi-
cantly from the rules of criminal procedure, it is difficult even to
imagine what this concept of "human dignity" is that is supposed to
be more important than truth in civil litigation. 175
A second objection to lawyer disclosure is that it would violate
170. See Uviller, supra note 162, at 1072-74. In addition, the defense lawyer may ethi-
cally enter a plea of "not guilty," even though he knows that his client committed the crime,
because the purpose of the plea is to force the state to its burden of proof. Similarly, the
defense lawyer may argue the falsity of evidence known to be accurate, STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.8(a) (1979), and cross-examine witnesses known to be telling the
truth, id. § 4-7.6 & commentary, because these are virtually the only means available to test
the state in its efforts to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Professor Freedman argues
that cross-examination of a truthful witness is permissible because the lawyer's failure to do
so would constitute an indirect violation of confidentiality. Freedman, Professional Responsi-
bility of the Criminal Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. Rnv. 1469,
1474-75 (1966). This argument raises difficult questions regarding the value of confidentiality
in relation to other goals of the adversary system in both criminal and civil trials. Therefore,
the better explanation is that reliance on cross-examination is an effective (sometimes the only
effective) tool for implementing the defendant's right to put the state to its proof.
171. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
172. See Luban, supra note 121 at 92 ("[In civil cases], the primary end of adversary
adjudication is legal justice, the assignment of rewards and remedies on the basis of parties'
behavior as prescribed by legal norms."); see also note 128 and accompanying text.
173. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
174. See supra notes 132-33 and accompanying text.
175. After dispensing with the so-called "truth theory," Professor Donagan adopts ajus-
tification for the adversary system based on a modification of the Freedman-Fried theory of
human dignity and autonomy. Donagan, supra note 140, at 126-33. However, in further
analyzing the concept of "autonomy," Donagan ultimately concludes that it would be in-
defensible for a lawyer to assist a client in advancing claims which are patently false. Id. at
133. Thus, under Donagan's version of "human dignity," "truth" is a subordinate goal only
to the extent that the client's version of the facts is "possibly true," id. at 131, and the attor-
ney is obligated to assure his clients a "fair opportunity to raise questions about what is due
to them under the law." Id. at 133. This version is by no means incompatible with the "truth
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the duty of confidentiality.' 76 However, unlike party presentation
of evidence, confidentiality is not itself an essential element of the
adversary system.' 77 The standard rationale for confidentiality is
utilitarian: Confidentiality encourages clients to give lawyers the in-
formation necessary for effective advocacy.'78 But this utilitarian
reasoning ignores the already existing deterrents built into the ad-
versary system itself-that is, those very rules of civil procedure
designed to promote truthful verdicts. Given these rules and the
limited protection of the attorney-client privilege, 17 it is difficult to
see how an extended duty of confidentiality effectively promotes cli-
ent disclosures, when the client already knows (or should know)
that his lawyer will not countenance a false pleading or a failure to
respond to proper discovery requests.180  Although the criticism
that under the draft proposal a lawyer "could not promise his client
that his preliminary disclosures might not injure his cause" is
true, '8 it is also true that a lawyer cannot truthfully make that
promise even under the present rules.
Under a privacy analysis, it could be argued that even though
the information is subject to discovery, it remains private until the
opponent specifically requests its disclosure. Nonetheless, the right
to privacy is not absolute, but rather it may be overridden by more
important rights and duties.'82 The problem with the draft propo-
sal is that it assumes that the more important duty is "Candor To-
ward the Tribunal." If, however, the attorney has no general duty
theory" which underlies this Article's assumption that the adversary system of litigation is
justified. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
176. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 4-5.
177. See supra note 129 and accompanying text.
178. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 4-5; supra note 129 and accompanying text.
179. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
180. In addition, the client is (or should be) aware that, under the Model Rules, the
lawyer has an affirmative duty to disclose all material adverse facts in an ex parte proceeding.
MODEL RuLfss OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(d) (1983). At the outset of the case,
neither the lawyer nor the client can be sure whether and under what circumstances ex parte
proceedings may be necessary. Therefore, the prospect of occasional attorney disclosure
under the rejected proposal should cause no more deterrence than that already caused by
Rule 3.3(d).
Of course, knowledge that the truth may hurt will encourage some clients to lie, and some
of these clients may well have had an entirely legitimate case, even were the truth known. Cf.
M. FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 4-5 (criminal defendant who mistakenly assumed that she
had no lawful defense was reluctant to disclose facts to her attorney). Nonetheless, we as-
sume that rules requiring truthful pleading, compliance with discovery requests, and disclo-
sure in ex parte proceedings are justified, despite the existence of such cases, because we
believe that these rules promote justice in the vast majority of cases.
181. Uviller, supra note 162, at 1072 (discussing the more radical Frankel proposal).
182. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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to seek "truth," and if the adversary system itself can tolerate a few
inaccurate verdicts, then it is difficult to see why or how this candor
is owed to the court, instead of being owed directly to the opponent
who will suffer harm as the result of an unjust verdict.
Recall that it is not only the adversary system, but also the fre-
quency of conflict between client interests and the interests of others
that generally permits the lawyer to be unconcerned with the effect
of his actions on others.18 3 Moreover, the assumption that the op-
posing counsel will effectively protect his own client's interests is an
additional justification for this lack of concern in adversary litiga-
tion. Assuming that the failure of opposing counsel to discover a
crucial fact represents a "breakdown" in the system"S4 -probably
attributable to either a lack of resources or a lack of diligence on the
part of opposing counsel-then this additional justification is no
longer available. The question then becomes whether disclosure of
adverse facts under the draft proposal would have a significant ad-
verse effect on the lawyer's ability to maintain a client-care
perspective.
Under the draft proposal, a lawyer would be required to disclose
an adverse fact only when it would "probably have a substantial
effect in the determination of a material issue."18'  Given the truth-
ful pleading requirement in the federal rules, it must be assumed
that the lawyer reasonably believes good grounds exist to support
his client's position;"8 6 therefore, disclosure would only be required
in rare cases. If disclosure is to be required only in an exceptional
case, it is difficult to justify the failure to recognize at least a limited
duty on the part of a lawyer to consider the adversary's interests.
It remains unclear whether this limited duty would be strong
enough to outweigh the client's right to privacy. In some cases, a
client may have a strong privacy interest that clearly outweighs the
potential for an insubstantial harm to the opponent.18 7 Nonethe-
183. See supra notes 144-55 and accompanying text.
184. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 comment (Initial Draft
1979), reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, Aug. 27, 1979, at 36, ol. 3.
185. See supra note 165 and accompanying text.
186. See supra note 132 and accompanying text.
187. For example, disclosure by the defense attorney in a medical malpractice action
might cause considerable harm to the reputation and career of the defendant-physician. If
the plaintiff is wealthy or completely covered by medical insurance, the defense attorney
might properly conclude that disclosure would be morally inappropriate.
There are other reasons why disclosure should not be required. First, given that the law-
yer should reasonably believe that there are good grounds to support his client's position, see
supra note 132 and accompanying text, it will be difficult to judge when particular "facts" (or
other evidence, such as a change in a witness' story) are so significant that they clearly ought
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less, there are presumably some cases in which the client's privacy
interest is slight and would be outweighed by a substantial threat of
harm to the opponent. 1 88  If there are reasons against at least per-
missive disclosure in such an exceptional case, they have yet to be
sufficiently articulated by the profession.
2. Disclosure of Client Perjury
One of the few disclosure reforms proposed by the Kutak Com-
mission that was accepted by the ABA House of Delegates is the
provision for mandatory disclosure of client perjury in both civil
and criminal cases. 189 If adopted by the states, this provision will
finally resolve a long-standing controversy within the profession. 190
Under the Model Code, a lawyer may not knowingly present
perjured testimony.1 9 If the lawyer learns of client perjury after
the fact, he is prohibited from revealing it to either the court or the
to be revealed. Cf. White, Machiavelli and the Bar: Ethical Limitations on Lying in Negotia-
tion, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 926, 936 (difficulties of interpreting similar language
in proposal for disclosure in negotiations). Second, because of the strong tradition of client
loyalty, lawyers may be unlikely to comply with rules that require disclosure in such cases,
and to have a widely violated rule may be "a continuing hypocrisy that may poison the
application of the remaining rules." Id. at 937. Finally, lawyers (and clients) will be espe-
cially reluctant to reveal adverse facts when they suspect that the other side is not prepared to
be equally candid. If the duty owed is not one of candor to the court, but rather a duty of
benevolence owed directly to the opponent, then this last consideration is obviously a mate-
rial one.
188. For example, in Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962),
the lawyer for the defense in a personal injury case discovered that the plaintiff had a life
threatening aortic aneurism, apparently caused by the accident, that the plaintiff's doctors
had not found. This information did not even relate to the client-defendant and thus was not
close to the client's "core self'; moreover, the only adverse effect of disclosure would have
been a judgment for damages in accordance with damages actually sustained, although well
in excess of what a jury might otherwise have rendered.
189. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3(a)(4) (1983). While the
rule merely states that a lawyer "shall take reasonable remedial measures," the comment
makes clear that if the client himself will not recant, and withdrawal will not "remedy the
situation," the lawyer must make disclosure to the court. Id. Rule 3.3 comment. Rule 3.3
also makes it clear that when a lawyer learns in advance that his client intends to commit
perjury, the lawyer may not present such testimony. See id Rule 3.3(a)(4) & comment.
190. See Kramer, Clients' Frauds and Their Lawyers' Obligations: A Study in Profes-
sional Irresponsibility, 67 GEO. L.J. 991 (1979); Lawry, Lying Confidentiality and the Adver-
sary System of Justice, 1977 UTAH L. REv. 653, 678-80; Polster, The Dilemma of the
Perurious Defendant: Resolution, Not Avoidance, 28 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 3 (1977); Wolf-
ram, Client Perury II, supra note 128; Wolfram, Client Perury, 50 S. CAL. L. REv. 809
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Wolfram, Client Perury 1]. As Professor Wolfram notes, "A
persistent criticism of the existing Code of Professional Responsibility has been that it deals
with the problem of client perjury in a confusing, obscure, and convoluted manner." Wolf-
ram, Client Perury II, supra note 128, at 968 n.31.
191. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(4) (1983).
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opponent, except in rare cases. 192 However, when the lawyer learns
of his client's intent to commit perjury, it is unclear whether with-
drawal is sufficient, or whether the attorney may (or must) disclose
the client's unlawful intent.1 93 One commentator has argued that at
least in criminal cases, the attorney is obligated not only to allow
the client to take the stand and perjure himself, but also to question
him and argue the truth of his testimony in the normal fashion.194
In civil cases, the present distinctions between intended and
completed perjury and between withdrawal and disclosure are
clearly unjustified. Presumably, the distinctions are based on the
fact that a lawyer can refuse to present perjured testimony and, if
necessary, withdraw (either before or after the perjury is commit-
ted) without a direct violation of confidentiality. It must be
remembered, however, that the standard utilitarian justification for
confidentiality is that it promotes client disclosures, and further,
that full disclosure may be deterred just as effectively through indi-
rect, as well as direct, revelation of confidences.19 Moreover, it has
192. When originally adopted, DR 7-102(B)(1) read as follows:
(B) A lawyer who receives information clearly establishing that: (1) his client has,
in the course of the representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal
shall promptly call upon his client to rectify the same, and if his client refuses or is
unable to do so, he shall reveal the fraud to the affected person or tribunal.
ANNOTATED CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 306-07 (Am. B. Found. 1979). In
1974, the words "except when the information is protected as a privileged communication"
were added, thus creating an exception to the rule requiring disclosure. Id. In 1975, the
ABA Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility broadly construed the term "priv-
ileged communication" to mean both "confidences" and "secrets" under DR 4-101. ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975). According to the
Committee, disclosure might still be required, but only if the information was obtained from
a third party and not in connection with the attorney's professional relationship with the
client, or if the disclosure were required by law. See id.
For a discussion of the ethics of revealing client perjury in states that have not adopted
the amended version of DR 7-102(B)(1), see Kramer, supra note 190, at 994-98.
Even when the attorney may not be permitted to disclose prior perjury, he may be re-
quired to withdraw, at least in civil cases. See Wolfram, Client Perjury I, supra note 190, at
854-62.
193. While DR 4-l01(C)(3) (like its predecessor, Canon 37) permits disclosure of a cli-
ent's intent to commit a crime, see supra note 111 and accompanying text, at least one ABA
opinion suggests that having withdrawn, the attorney may not disclose the client's intent to
commit perjury. See ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 268
(1945). But cf. ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1416
(1978) (implying that disclosure might have been required when perjury had occurred in
depositions, if attorneys had not accomplished termination of fraudulent suit).
194. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 40-41.
195. See, e.g., Freedman, supra note 170, at 1474-75 (failure to cross-examine a truthful
prosecution witness would constitute indirect violation of confidentiality and would deter
criminal defendants from full disclosure to their attorneys). Thus, a lawyer's withdrawal in
mid-suit may constitute a clear (if indirect) signal both to opposing counsel and to successor
counsel that something is amiss.
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been demonstrated'96 that there is a great deal of deterrence already
built into the system and that society has determined through its
rules of civil procedure that the potential harm of such deterrence is
outweighed by the importance of truth in civil adjudication. There-
fore, any additional deterrence resulting from a mandatory disclo-
sure rule will probably be negligible and will almost certainly be
outweighed by the need to achieve the more important goal of the
adversary system-truth. 197
Similarly, under a privacy analysis, the client who would take
unfair advantage of his opponent through illegal means is clearly an
"unjust aggressor" who forfeits his right to privacy. 198 Alterna-
tively, even if the client retains some right to privacy, it should be
overridden by his attorney's recognition of a duty to either the
court, the opponent, or both to keep the proceedings free from ille-
gal overreaching on the part of the client.1 99
The utilitarian approach in criminal cases is somewhat more dif-
ficult because of the absence of significant deterrents to full disclo-
sure under the rules of criminal procedure. Professor Freedman
may be correct in his assumption that knowledge that the lawyer
will refuse to put the defendant on the stand to "tell his story" may
deter a significant number of defendants from the full disclosure
essential to an adequate defense.2 "0 Nonetheless, it is far from clear
196. See supra notes 132-33, 180 and accompanying text.
197. See, eg., Lawry, supra note 190, at 675 (disclosure of peijured testimony probably
"will not create widespread changes in client behavior," and, even if it did, it is debatable
"whether the positive value of increased client trust would be worth the negative results").
198. See supra note 80 and accompanying text. Thus, as one court has stated, "When a
prospective client approaches an attorney, he may expect that the attorney will assist him to
the best of the attorney's ability. He may not expect, however, that the attorney will tolerate
lying or any other species of fraud in the process." Committee on Professional Ethics v.
Crary, 245 N.W.2d 298, 306 (Iowa 1976).
199. Cf. Lawry, supra note 190, at 674 (adversary system itself endangered if "lying is
condoned through a mistaken assumption about the place 'confidentiality' has in the sys-
tem").
Perhaps a more difficult case involves the lawyer who does not discover his client's per-
jury until after the termination of the proceeding. If disclosure by the lawyer would enable
the opponent to obtain a new trial or some other form of redress, then there does not appear
to be a sound reason not to require disclosure as in an ongoing proceeding. But see MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT Rule 3.3 comment (1983) (obligation ends at conclusion
of proceeding); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.3 comment (Proposed
Final Draft 1981) (obligation ends at conclusion of proceeding, but lawyer has permission to
rectify consequences). If, however, no such redress is available, then the only purpose served
by disclosure is punishment of the client, and disclosure should not be required or permitted.
See infra notes 281-86 and accompanying text (outside adversarial process, disclosure of past
crimes permissible only to prevent or rectify substantial harm to others).
200. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 31.
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that the existence of such a substantial deterrent causes more harm
than it prevents.
Part of the problem is determining what constitutes "harm,"
given the various goals of the criminal justice system. If an "igno-
rant innocent" will not confide in his attorney because of his mis-
taken belief that only perjury will free him,20 1 then this is surely a
harm that society would wish to avoid. But, these cases are un-
doubtedly rare,202 and there are limits to how far society is willing
to go to prevent the conviction of the innocent.
Another aspect of the problems is how to assess the "harm" that
occurs when a guilty defendant is deterred from confiding in his
attorney and, as a result, commits perjury without his attorney's
knowledge. Such client perjury is not only a crime, but also an
abuse of the criminal process which may result in acquittals that
would not otherwise occur. On the other hand, if full disclosure is
essential to an effective defense, then the combination of lack of can-
dor to the attorney and unsophisticated perjury may in fact reduce
the defendant's chance for acquittal or a lighter sentence. If so,
then perhaps the "harm" to defendants, whether innocent or guilty,
outweighs the harm of a few unjust acquittals.2" 3 Of course, the
vulnerable link in this argument is the assumption that the lack of
effective counsel, which occurs as a result of a guilty client's desire
to commit perjury, is a "harm" that society wishes to avoid 2" at the
expense of the integrity of the legal process and the increased ac-
quittals that result from credible perjury.
This same problem arguably arises under a deontological ap-
proach to the disclosure of client perjury in criminal cases. It has
thus been argued that to deprive a criminal defendant of an effective
defense because of ethical rules, which inhibit full disclosure by the
client, is to render meaningless the criminal justice system's para-
mount goal of respecting the dignity of the individual.2"5 The flaw
201. See Donagan, supra note 140, at 144-45 (using Professor Freedman's example of a
battered wife who shot her husband in self-defense and then lied about doing so because of
her ignorance of the availability of a legal defense).
202. See id. at 145 (competent lawyer should be able to anticipate fears and elicit the
truth).
203. This argument would be strengthened if it were also true that under a rule of strict
confidentiality, attorneys could persuade their clients to tell the truth in the office, as well as
avoid the harm of perjury by persuading their clients that they would be better off not taking
the stand.
204. Cf. Donagan, supra note 140, at 144 (arguing, contrary to Professor Freedman's
assertion, that there is no violation of "human dignity" when a criminal defendant is deterred
from full disclosure because of a belief that such disclosure will disadvantage his case).
205. See M. FREEDMAN, supra note 167, at 5.
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in this argument is the assumption that the ineffective defense re-
suits from the ethical rules themselves, when in fact it is the defend-
ant's own autonomous decision to withhold information that is
responsible for the harm that may ensue.2 °6 To ensure that the dig-
nity of the criminal defendant is respected, the lawyer need only
inform him that while he cannot permit the client to commit per-
jury, he will be in a better position to make an effective defense if
the client is completely candid. It is then up to the defendant to
decide if he wants to risk losing the benefits of fully informed coun-
sel in order to guarantee his ability to lie on the stand.2" 7
The privacy analysis in criminal cases does not appear to differ
significantly from the analysis in civil cases.2"5 Of course, the crimi-
nal defendant need not take the stand at all, but if he does, he is
treated in almost all respects like his civil counterpart. 20 9 By com-
mitting perjury, the criminal defendant not only unjustly takes ad-
vantage of his opponent, but also abuses his unique status under the
criminal adversary system.210
206. See supra note 204.
207. Donagan, supra note 140, at 146.
208. See supra notes 198-99 and accompanying text.
209. See, eg., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (statement, which is rendered
inadmissible against defendant in prosecution's case-in-chief because obtained in violation of
Miranda safeguards, may be used to impeach defendant's credibility should he elect to tes-
tify). For one of several examples where criminal defendants are treated differently than
other witnesses, see FED. R. EVD. 609(a)(1) (balancing process for impeachment by prior
felony conviction not involving dishonesty or false statement).
210. See, eg., Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971). In Harris, the Court stated:
Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his defense, or to refuse to do so.
But that privilege cannot be construed to include the right to commit perjury ....
Having voluntarily taken the stand, petitioner was under an obligation to speak
truthfully and accurately, and the prosecution here did no more than utilize the
traditional truth-testing devices of the adversary process ....
The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use per-
jury by way of a defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent
utterances.
Id at 225-26. See also Polster, supra note 190, at 30 ("It seems particularly objectionable for
the defendant to commit perjury in a system which affords the defendant the right of remain-
ing silent."); cf. Wolfram, Client Perjury I, supra note 190, at 840 n. 117 (details various ways
in which unique status of criminal defendant puts him in a "particularly advantageous strate-
gic position to commit perjury effectively").
It has been argued that criminal defendants have a constitutional right both to testify and
to receive effective assistance of counsel while they testify, even if the testimony is perjured.
See, eg., Polster, supra note 190, at 15-29; cf. Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjury and the
Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evidence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601, 633-39
(1979) (attorney disclosure would violate fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion). The Supreme Court recently held that there was no sixth amendment violation of the
right to effective assistance in a case where a defense lawyer successfully persuaded the de-
fendant to testify truthfully by threatening to withdraw or to disclose the perjury if the de-
fendant lied. Nix v. Whiteside, 106 S. Ct. 988 (1986). While the majority opinion in Nx
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C. Limits on the Prima Facie Obligation: Nonlitigation
Traditionally, the most significant limitation on the lawyer's
duty of confidentiality, in the nonlitigation context, has been the
exception for permissive disclosure of a client's intent to commit a
crime or fraud.211 This exception merely tracks the evidentiary
privilege for attorney-client communications and does not represent
any balancing of the relevant interests that are typically present
outside of the context of attorney testimony against a client in
court.212 While there have been efforts to permit, or compel, disclo-
sure of some completed client wrongs, 213 these efforts have been
thwarted by two prevalent but mistaken beliefs. The first is that the
attorney-client privilege itself forbids such disclosure,214 and the
second is that the privilege represents a legal tradition in which the
value of confidentiality outweighs almost all other interests, includ-
ing the interests of innocent victims of a rectifiable crime or
fraud.215
Ironically, although the Kutak Commission set out to break
with this tradition and expand the range of attorney disclosure, it
ultimately was forced to include a confidentiality provision in the
Model Rules that actually cuts back on the disclosure presently al-
lowed under the Model Code. 2 16 Thus, the ABA House of Dele-
gates not only rejected the permissive disclosure of past crimes and
implied approval of ethical rules prohibiting lawyer-assisted client perjury, see id., four jus-
tices expressed their belief that the decision in no way resolved the controversy surrounding
the client perjury issue in the context of drafting state ethics codes. lId (concurring opinions
of Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens).
211. See supra notes 98-111 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 110-13 and accompanying text.
213. See infra notes 286-90 and accompanying text.
214. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
215. See supra notes 109-11 and accompanying text.
216. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 4-101(C)(3) (1983)
(permissive disclosure of any intended crime) and MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (disclosure permissible to prevent harms
"likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial
interest or property of another") with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule
1.6(b)(1) (1983) (permissive disclosure limited to crimes likely to result in "immediate death
or substantial bodily harm"). Earlier versions of the Model Rules provided for even more
expansive disclosure. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.5 (Initial
Draft 1979), reprinted in Legal Times of Washington, Aug. 27, 1979, at 27, col. 1; MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 (Discussion Draft 1980).
There was, however, one important instance in which the Kutak Commission itself nar-
rowed the range of permissive disclosure, and that is the requirement that the harm sought to
be prevented be substantial. Compare MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR
4-101(C)(3) (1983) with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Pro-
posed Final Draft 1981).
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frauds when the attorney was an unwitting participant,217 it also
rejected the disclosure of intended frauds,218 and limited the disclo-
sure of intended crimes to those involving "imminent death or sub-
stantial bodily harm."2 19
The philosophical approach may prove helpful in evaluating the
merits of both the present and traditional ABA positions, as well as
some suggested alternatives. At the outset, it is readily apparent
that the prospect of relatively minor injury is not sufficient to over-
ride the prima facie obligation of confidentiality. Thus, the present
ABA position is clearly justified in its attempt to limit disclosure to
cases involving substantial harm.22 It is less clear: (1) whether the
substantial harm to be prevented should be limited to death or seri-
ous bodily harm; (2) whether and how the legal nature of the in-
tended act should affect the permissibility of disclosure; and (3)
whether the fact that the client has already acted should foreclose
lawyer disclosure in all cases.221
1. Disclosure Preventing Substantial Injury Other Than Death or
Bodily Harm
Prior to amendment by the ABA House of Delegates, the pro-
posed Model Rules provided for permissive disclosure when neces-
sary "to prevent the client from committing a criminal or
fraudulent act that the lawyer believes is likely to result in death or
substantial bodily harm, or substantial injury to the financial inter-
est or property of another." '222 Putting aside for the moment ques-
tions regarding the limitation of disclosure to crimes and/or frauds
and the distinction between past and future acts, the question re-
mains whether the ABA was justified in narrowing the range of per-
217. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucr Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Proposed Final
Draft 1981).
218. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final
Draft 1981). As noted earlier, the present Model Code may or may not permit disclosure of
intended frauds that are not also crimes. See supra note 111.
219. Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Fi-
nal Draft 1981) (permissive disclosure includes crimes "likely to result in death or substantial
bodily harm or substantial injury to the financial interest or property of another") with
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(1) (1983) (permissive disclosure
limited to crimes likely to result in "imminent death or substantial bodily harm").
220. See supra note 216.
221. The only exceptions for disclosure of past conduct are the mandatory disclosure of
client perjury, see supra note 189 and accompanying text, and the permissive disclosure of
information necessary for the lawyer to collect a fee or defend his own conduct, see MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983).
222. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
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missive disclosure to cases involving only physical harm to the
person. As will be demonstrated, there is no justification for at-
tempts to distinguish future crimes involving death or substantial
bodily harm from future crimes or frauds involving substantial in-
jury to financial or property interests.
There are serious flaws in the utilitarian reasoning used to sup-
port the present distinction. The Comment to Rule 1.6 boldly as-
serts that, while the prohibition of attorney disclosure in most cases
sacrifices the interests of potential victims in favor of preserving
confidentiality, in the long run the public will be better protected,
since clients will be encouraged to reveal their plans and lawyers
will then dissuade the clients from carrying them out.22 3 Aside
from the fact that there is no empirical evidence that this "assump-
tion" is true, the Comment ignores the fact that without at least the
threat of disclosure, the lawyer has little means of "persuading" an
otherwise recalcitrant client to comply with the law.224 Moreover,
the Comment fails to explain why lawyers are permitted to reveal
intended crimes involving death or substantial bodily harm but are
not permitted to reveal intended crimes and frauds involving sub-
stantial harm to the financial or property interests of another. Pre-
sumably the same "assumption" applies equally to all those
situations, and thus more lives might be saved (in the long run) if
lawyers were prohibited from disclosing even threats of murder.225
223. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 comment (1983).
224. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (Discussion Draft
1980) ("[to some extent the existence of this discretion [to disclose] inhibits disclosure by the
client and yet enables the lawyer to inhibit the client from committing the wrongful act").
225. Indeed, this very point was made (unwittingly) in an earlier version of this same
comment which noted that "[a]ny rule governing disclosure of threatened harm involves bal-
ancing the interests of one group of potential victims against those of another," and, further,
that no basis exists for "a categorical preference. . . in favor either of immediate victims of a
present client or potential victims of later clients." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CON-
DUCT Rule 1.7 comment (Discussion Draft 1980). If the point is applicable to victims of
crimes or frauds involving injury to their financial or property interests, it should be equally
applicable to victims of crimes involving death or substantial bodily harm.
In addition, the comment fails to address the obvious discrepancy between the virtually
absolute duty of confidentiality where the interests of others are concerned and the broad
exception for disclosure when the interests affected are those of the lawyers themselves. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(2) (1983) (disclosure permitted in
controversies between lawyer and client to establish defense to criminal or civil action against
lawyer and to respond to client allegations in a disciplinary or other legal proceeding).
Surely, more clients are potentially affected by breaches of confidentiality which occur during
a fee dispute than by breaches which occur in the course of prevention of crimes involving
death or substantial bodily harm. The explanation offered in the comment is that "the benefi-
ciary of a fiduciary relationship may not exploit it to the detriment of the fiduciary," see id
Rule 1.6 comment (1983); however, this is deontological reasoning which not only appears to
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If utilitarianism does not clearly support a rule permitting dis-
closure of crimes involving death or substantial bodily harm, then
the consensus among lawyers that disclosure is permissible in at
least these cases must be grounded in nonutilitarian reasoning. De-
ontological reasoning offers a more than adequate explanation: cli-
ents threatening crimes of violence are unjust aggressors who have
either entirely forfeited their right to privacy (as to that threat) or
have but a slight interest in privacy that is clearly overridden by
their victim's interest. Of course, this reasoning is equally applica-
ble to clients threatening crimes or frauds involving substantial
harm to the financial or property interests of others. They, too, are
clearly unjust aggressors, and it is difficult to see how the nature of
the harm threatened affects either the forfeiture or devaluing of
their right to privacy in relation to the substantial interest of their
threatened victims.
Finally, none of the "institutional" concerns regarding the
proper role of lawyers in society supports the present distinction
between crimes of violence and crimes or frauds threatening serious
economic harm. The concept of client autonomy within the law in
no way sanctions acts that are criminal or fraudulent. Moreover,
because it is always possible for the client to prevent disclosure by
renouncing his intent, there is no substantial threat to the autonomy
of the "ignorant innocent," '226 who is certainly entitled to a lawyer's
assistance in ascertaining the legal status of an intended act. Simi-
larly, while it may be true that clients more frequently consult law-
yers prior to engaging in crimes and frauds involving financial or
property interests than they do prior to engaging in crimes of vio-
lence, it is difficult to see how this fact will adversely affect the cli-
ent-care perspective in most cases. The lawyer must assume that
most clients do not want to commit a serious crime or fraud, if only
to avoid detection and its consequences. Thus, in determining
whether the proposed act is indeed unlawful, the lawyer's initial
concern for the interests of others cannot be separated from his ini-
tial concern for the interests of the client himself.227 If the prospect
of disclosure undermines the lawyer-client relationship at all, it will
do so only in situations where the client knows in advance that he
conflict with the utilitarian reasoning described above, but which also ignores the fact that
clients who question their lawyers' fees are not necessarily wrongdoers bent on exploiting the
attorney-client relationship for their own illicit gain.
226. See supra note 201 and accompanying text.
227. Moreover, since lawyers may not knowingly assist in client crimes or frauds, see
infra notes 156-210 and accompanying text, the lawyer must also consider his own interests
whenever such client conduct is proposed.
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will insist on an unlawful course of conduct. It is difficult to see
why anyone but the most avaricious lawyer or client would argue
for the preservation of the lawyer-client relationship in those
cases.
228
2. Disclosure Preventing Substantial Injury Resulting From
Intended Client Acts Other Than Those That are
Criminal or Fraudulent
Having concluded that the nature of the harm threatened does
not necessarily determine the propriety of disclosure, the question
arises whether disclosure should be limited to crimes and/or frauds,
or broadened to include other unlawful acts, or even, in rare cases,
acts that are entirely lawful. After all, our counterparts in the med-
ical profession have not been unduly concerned with the legal sta-
tus of a patient's proposed activities.229 Moreover, if the concern is
to prevent harm-and not unlawful acts, as such°23 -- then perhaps
the insistence on characterization of the legal status of an act is sim-
ply unwarranted legalism on the part of the lawyers.
Because of the historical linkage between the ethical duty of
confidentiality and the law of attorney-client privilege, the profes-
sion has not yet articulated sound ethical reasons why disclosure of
intended acts2 3 1 ought to be limited to unlawful activity in general,
or crimes and frauds in particular. An obvious, if partial, rationale
for the former can be found in the previously discussed principle of
client autonomy, that is, the notion that in a democratic society
committed to individual autonomy and to the rule of law, lawyers
ought not interfere with client acts that are clearly, or even argua-
bly, within the law.232 However, the prima facie obligation to
228. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7 comment (Discussion
Draft 1980), which states:
The qualified protection of confidences . . . is extended not in the interest of the
client who is determined to pursue wrongful purposes, but in the interest of encour-
aging clients in general to be candid with their lawyers to the end that they might be
guided in complying with the law.
229. See supra notes 37-44 and accompanying text (while present AMA Principles re-
strict disclosure to that required by law, such Principles do not appear to reflect a consensus
among physicians generally).
230. This assumption underlies even the very restrictive rule approved by the ABA
House of Delegates, which did not permit disclosure of all "crimes" but only those resulting
in a certain kind of substantial harm to others. See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying
text; see also infra notes 281-84 and accompanying text (permissible purposes of possible
disclosure of past client conduct).
231. For a discussion of ethical reasons for prohibiting disclosure of past conduct, see
infra notes 262-314 and accompanying text.
232. See supra notes 135-43 and accompanying text.
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honor client autonomy within the law does not itself entail either the
nondisclosure of legal wrongs other than crimes or frauds, or
even the nondisclosure of entirely lawful acts in extreme
circumstances.233
a. Broadening Disclosure of "Unlawful" Activity Beyond
Crimes or Frauds. The attorney-client privilege is not the only pos-
sible source of an ethical rule limiting disclosure to crimes or
frauds. Proponents of the traditional approach would probably be
quick to point out that there is an analogous provision in the Model
Rules that is clearly derived from ethics and not from any rule of
law. That provision prohibits the lawyer from counseling or assist-
ing the client in any conduct that the lawyer knows to be either
"criminal or fraudulent. ' 234 While this section narrows somewhat
the range of prohibited acts under the Model Code23 5-and is likely
for that reason to be controversial-it has at least some plausible
justification.
As the Kutak Commission noted, the inclusion of intentional
torts as a prohibited activity can be criticized on the ground that, at
least with respect to some property rights, the commission of a legal
wrong can occur as the result of a good faith effort to determine
precisely what those rights are, or as simply an overzealous (and in
hindsight misguided) effort to effectuate a self-help remedy.236 To
the extent that the parameters of tort law are less capable of ascer-
tainment than the law of crimes or frauds, fear of possible discipli-
nary action may deter lawyers from pursuing the not clearly, but at
least arguably, lawful objectives of their clients, to the detriment of
their clients' legitimate interests. Finally, the knowing commission
of a legal wrong, including even some intentional torts, is not neces-
sarily the commission of a moral wrong, and it would be extremely
difficult to specify precisely which legal wrongs (other than crimes
or frauds) ought to be categorically prohibited.237
233. Id.
234. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
235. The parallel section of the Model Code prohibits lawyer assistance in conduct
known to be "illegal or fraudulent." See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
DR 7-102(A)(7) (1983). The term "illegal" has been interpreted to encompass conduct that
was neither criminal nor fraudulent, although the "precise contours" of this area are unclear.
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) legal background (Proposed Final
Draft 1981) (including references to cases involving intentional torts and drafting of docu-
ments containing legally prohibited terms).
236. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) legal background
(Proposed Final Draft 1981).
237. An additional category, the drafting of documents containing legally prohibited
terms, was proposed by the Kutak Commission but rejected by the ABA House of Delegates.
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These justifications do not necessarily apply in the context of
permissive disclosure of intended client acts that are clearly unlaw-
ful. Fear of possible disciplinary action will not cause a lawyer to
disclose or fail to pursue an arguably lawful and good faith claim, if
disclosure is not required, but merely permitted. Similarly, while it
is difficult to specify classes of legal wrongs (other than crimes or
frauds) that are typically moral wrongs as well, there will be some
individual cases in which the answer will be clear. Again, the per-
missive nature of the rule (as well as the very strong tradition of
client loyalty) makes it unlikely that a lawyer will disclose in all but
the most egregious cases.238
Perhaps the Kutak Commission was responding to the weakness
of these traditional rationales for limiting disclosure to crimes and
fraud when it proposed a rule that permitted disclosure when neces-
sary to prevent "the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act by
the client."239 The language suggests a significant expansion of the
prior rule. However, the term "wrongful act" was limited by defini-
tion to "[a]n act violating a civil or penal standard in which knowl-
edge of the circumstances is an element of the violation."2" Thus,
while intentional torts were to be included, other torts-including
negligence, strict liability, defamation and invasion of privacy-
were not, nor were many other acts that would result in civil liabil-
ity-for example, breach of contract--even though in the particular
case the client might in fact act with full knowledge of both the
circumstances and the unlawful nature of the act.24 1
Compare MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (Proposed Final Draft
1981) (prohibited "preparation of a written instrument containing terms the lawyer knows or
reasonably should know are legally prohibited") with MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL
CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983) (no such provision).
238. For an extensive discussion of such an egregious case-Ford Motor Co.'s decision
not to recall the 1973 Pinto with its negligently designed gas tank, see D. Luban, supra note
91.
Because disclosure is not required, the lawyer will be free to consider all of the circum-
stances and unique aspects of each case which will enhance the likelihood of an accurate
assessment of the moral propriety of disclosure. Such a case-by-case treatment would not be
possible under a rule prohibiting lawyer assistance in client conduct that is in some sense
unlawful.
239. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c)(2) (Discussion Draft
1980). This section also would have permitted disclosure when necessary to "rectify the con-
sequences of a deliberately wrongful act by the client, except when the lawyer has been em-
ployed after the commission of such an act to represent the client concerning the act or its
consequences." Id. For a discussion of the ethics of disclosure of past client acts, see infra
notes 262-314 and accompanying text.
240. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Definitions (Discussion Draft 1980)
(emphasis added).
241. Cf. D. Luban, supra note 91, at 2-4 (discussing memorandum of Ford Motor Co.
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The Kutak Commission was apparently attempting to set out
classes of cases in which disclosure was most likely to be an appro-
priate option. It did so by isolating two significant features of these
cases: (1) the client's awareness that the proposed act would result
in either criminal or civil liability and (2) the fact that when knowl-
edge of the circumstances was an element of the unlawful activity,
the deliberate legal wrong was most likely to be a moral wrong as
well.242
The first feature-the client's awareness of the unlawful nature
of the act- is one that, absent exceptional circumstances, would
probably be justified under either utilitarian or deontological analy-
sis.243 As a matter of utility, potential clients with legitimate inter-
ests might well be deterred from seeking legal advice by the
prospect of attorney disclosure in situations in which the client in
good faith believes that his proposed conduct is or may be lawful. 2'
Similarly, where a client is unaware of the unlawful nature of his
proposed act, the client's right to privacy may be violated when he
is not given the opportunity, prior to lawyer disclosure, to volunta-
rily alter the proposed conduct in response to the lawyer's advice.
The second feature-the insistence on scienter as an element of
the legal wrong-is more problematic. It may well be that, absent
extraordinary circumstances, a client's knowledge of the circum-
stances should be required, in order to avoid a situation in which
the frequency of conflicting interests significantly endangers the cli-
ent-care perspective.245 On the other hand, it is far from clear that
which suggested that management knew in advance that the company would be liable in
negligence for deaths and injuries attributable to unsafe design of 1973 Pinto).
242. The term "deliberately" was not defined; however, since the term "wrongful act"
was defined to include knowledge of the circumstances, see supra note 240 and accompanying
text, "deliberately" presumably referred to the client's knowledge that the proposed act
would violate a civil or penal standard. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCr
Rule 1.7 comment (Discussion Draft 1980) (obligation of confidentiality not intended to serve
interests of client "determined to pursue wrongful purposes" but rather of clients desiring to
"be guided in complying with the law").
243. See supra notes 68-88 and accompanying text.
244. Clients would be less likely to hold back information if they knew that an attorney
was required to advise a client that a proposed act was unlawful before the attorney was
permitted to disclose, thereby giving the client the option of avoiding disclosure by volunta-
rily complying with the law.
The preceding section on adversary litigation concluded that arguments for maintaining
confidentiality based on fears of deterring client candor are highly exaggerated. See supra
notes 179-81, 195-97 and accompanying text. Of course, an important distinction between
litigation and nonlitigation is that in the former there is already a great deal of deterrence
built into the system, whereas in the latter there is not. See id.
245. See supra notes 147-55 and accompanying text.
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disclosure should be categorically prohibited in cases in which the
requisite knowledge is present, even though not technically required
by law, since in either case the lawyer will have made a subjective
determination of the client's mental state.
The strongest argument in favor of the requirement of scienter
as an element of the legal wrong is that it tends to isolate a class of
legal wrongs that are likely to be serious moral wrongs as well.2'
Nonetheless, there undoubtedly will be individual cases in which
scienter is present, although not required, where it is clear that the
client's failure to alter the proposed conduct is seriously immoral,
given the likelihood of substantial harm to others.247 The question
whether disclosure ought to be permitted in these cases probably
depends on how much discretion individual lawyers should be given
to determine the "serious immorality" of the proposed client act.
Exercising broad discretion will call for extensive and often
complex moral reasoning, for which most lawyers have no special
training or expertise. However, both the tradition of client loyalty
and important economic incentives248 suggest that it is unlikely that
giving lawyers permission to disclose in a large range of cases will, in
fact, result in widespread, and inappropriate, disclosure of client
confidences. If, however, it is a reasonable assumption that broader
disclosure options will in fact result in only marginally increased
disclosure, and that disclosure is most likely to occur in morally
appropriate cases, then the argument in favor of extending permis-
sive disclosure (in order to prevent substantial and legally unjusti-
fied harm) is difficult to rebut.24 9
246. For example, a client may deliberately, and with full knowledge of the circum-
stances, intend to breach a contractual obligation for which he would clearly be liable for
extensive damages in a civil action. Nonetheless, we would hardly think this an appropriate
case for disclosure without knowing a good deal more about the particular circumstances of
the case. Similarly, an intentional invasion of privacy may or may not be a serious moral
wrong (for which disclosure would be an appropriate option), depending on such factors as
the type of privacy interest involved (personal or commercial) and the likelihood that the
injured party would be in a position to recover adequate damages to compensate for the
injury. On the other hand, intentional torts such as assault, battery and false imprisonment
(all of which require intent as an element of the tort), RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§§ 20, 21, 35 (1965), are almost always moral as well as legal wrongs.
247. See, eg., supra notes 237, 241 and accompanying text.
248. See White, supra note 187, at 937-38.
249. One rebuttal argument that might be made here is that while attorneys may rarely
make voluntary disclosures, the existence of a permissive disclosure rule in an ethics code
may support the efforts of some to narrow the scope of the evidentiary privilege; thus, attor-
neys soon might be required to disclose previously protected confidences in judicial or admin-
istrative proceedings. See Redlich, Disclosure Provisions of the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct, 1980 AM. B. FOUND. RESEARCH J. 921, 982-84, 987. Moreover, permissive disclo-
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b. Disclosure of Entirely Lawful (or Arguably Lawful) Activity
in Extreme Circumstances Threatening Death or Substantial Bodily
Harm. If lawyers have a prima facie obligation to honor client au-
tonomy within the law, then they have strong reasons not to dis-
close and thereby interfere with intended client acts that are clearly,
or even arguably, lawful. Nonetheless, unless there is some justifi-
cation for making this obligation absolute, then the very nature of
this prima facie obligation entails that it may be overridden, albeit
only by another weighty consideration. 50 While disclosure to pre-
vent death or substantial bodily harm may not be the only "weighty
consideration" which might override the obligation to honor client
autonomy within the law, it is clearly the most plausible candidate.
Indeed it has already been suggested within the profession as a pos-
sible exception to the duty of confidentiality.25
At the outset, it must be noted that, with the exception of the
present disclosure rules, the obligation to honor client autonomy
within the law is not presently accorded the status of an absolute
obligation. Although the current Model Code requires a lawyer to
pursue "the lawful objectives of his client through reasonably avail-
able means permitted by law,"' 252 exceptions are recognized both for
a lawyer who "exercise[s] his professional judgment to waive or fail
to assert a right or position of his client ' 253 and for a lawyer who
refuses "to aid or participate in conduct that he believes to be un-
lawful, even though there is some support for an argument that the
conduct is legal. '2 54  While the recognition of these and other255
exceptions by no means entails disclosure in these circumstances, it
sure may enhance the likelihood that attorneys who decide to maintain confidentiality will be
found liable in tort for harm done by the client. Cf supra note 36 (effect of permissive ethics
code on tort liability of physicians). One might even speculate that the potential for tort
liability was a significant factor in the ABA House of Delegates' decision to narrow substan-
tially the range of disclosure presently permitted under the Model Code, an action analogous
to the most recent post-Tarasoff amendment to the AMA Code. See id. The most obvious
response to this argument is that we must trust our judges to reject unwarranted extensions or
modifications of substantive law as a result of otherwise appropriate changes in the ethics
code.
250. See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
251. See THE AMEmCAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCr Rule 1.6 (American Trial Law-
yer's Foundation, Revised Draft 1982). "A lawyer may reveal a client's confidence when and
to the extent that the lawyer reasonably believes that divulgence is necessary to prevent immi-
nent danger to human life." Id Rule 1.6 was not approved by the Commission, but was
supported by so many members that it was included as a "Supplemental Rule." Id. Rule 1.6
note.
252. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-101(A) (1983).
253. Id. DR 7-101(B)(1).
254. Id. DR 7-101(B)(2).
255. See, eg., id. DR 2-110(C)(1)(e) (lawyer has right to withdraw in nonlitigation when
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does clearly rebut any argument against such disclosure based
solely on an absolute duty to honor client autonomy within the
bounds of the law. The question remains whether there are other
considerations, more directly related to the prima facie obligation of
confidentiality, that would support a refusal to permit disclosures,
even to prevent death or substantial bodily harm, so long as the
client intends a clearly, or even arguably, lawful act.
To some extent, the argument based on utility suffers from the
same deficiencies as did the earlier argument regarding the viability
of a distinction between physical and financial harm.256 It is impos-
sible to prove whether more harm would be prevented by disclosure
(thus protecting immediate victims) or by maintaining confidential-
ity (thus potentially protecting future victims). Nonetheless, be-
cause most clients have a strong interest in determining the legal
status of an intended act, it is highly questionable whether the re-
mote possibility of attorney disclosure would, in fact, result in sub-
stantially fewer clients confiding in their attorneys.2 57 If it is true,
or even probably true, that no substantial deterrence would result,
then a utilitarian analysis should favor a rule permitting disclosure
in these emergency cases involving death or substantial bodily harm
even when the client intends a lawful act.
The argument in favor of permissive disclosure is obviously
strongest under a privacy analysis. While the client may not be an
"unjust aggressor," given that the proposed conduct is at least ar-
guably lawful, his interest in privacy may be slight in relation to the
important interests of the potential victims.2" 8 Moreover, to the ex-
tent that the client's interest in privacy in a particular case is sub-
stantial-that is, at or near the center of the "core self"' 25 9 -the
lawyer may be persuaded to maintain confidentiality, if that privacy
interest is not clearly outweighed by the more important interests of
others.
As with disclosure of unlawful acts, the final resolution of this
dilemma appears to depend on the desirability of allowing individ-
ual lawyers to determine when disclosure is morally appropriate.
client insists "that the lawyer engage in conduct that is contrary to the judgment and advice
of the lawyer but not [otherwise prohibited]").
256. See supra notes 223-25 and accompanying text.
257. In addition, given the traditional reluctance of lawyers to betray their clients' confi-
dences, it is unlikely that lawyers would automatically disclose, even in cases involving immi-
nent death or serious bodily harm. Clients who are aware of this reluctance would be even
less likely to be deterred from seeking legal advice.
258. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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Some but not all lawful (or arguably lawful) acts threatening death
or substantial bodily harm are seriously immoral acts in which dis-
closure would clearly be justified,26 and lawyers are not necessarily
well-equipped to resolve close cases. Nonetheless, if it is true that
the circumstances of legal representation make it unlikely that law-
yers will disclose except in rare and appropriate cases,261 then there
are strong reasons favoring a rule permitting disclosure to prevent
death or substantial bodily harm even when the client's intended
conduct is lawful, or arguably lawful.
3. Disclosure of Past and Continuing Client Misconduct
The attorney-client evidentiary privilege affords absolute protec-
tion to client communications regarding past misconduct.262 While
debatable,26 3 such protection is readily explained by the need for
evidence rules that are relatively easy to apply and by the fact that
such consultations typically constitute an entirely proper and desir-
able use of the attorney-client relationship. Given the availability of
other relevant evidence in most cases,264 it is not difficult to see why
attorneys are flatly prohibited from giving testimony concerning
such legitimate communications between themselves and their cli-
ents. However, ethical rules do not necessarily require the same
degree of certainty as do evidence rules.265 In addition, because
260. For example, even if properly designed, the 1973 Pinto might not have been as safe
as a slightly higher-priced competitor. Yet, it would not necessarily have been immoral to
put it on the market without disclosing this fact, even though a consumer might have been
more likely to suffer death or serious bodily harm. See D. Luban, supra note 91, at 8-10. On
the other hand, disclosure might well be warranted if it would bring about a change in the
safety standards which the auto industry was keeping artificially low by falsely (but not un-
lawfully) representing that certain safety devices were not feasible. See id. at 12. Disclosure
which forces a recall is probably also justified, despite the obvious harm to the corporation
itself, when the president of a company that sells aluminum alloy for use in high-altitude
airplanes, irresponsibly (but not necessarily unlawfully) disregards the advice of a majority of
his engineering staff that a new alloy is dangerously defective. See Ferren, The Corporate
Lawyers' Obligation to the Public Interest, 33 Bus. LAW. 1253 (1978).
261. See supra notes 229-33 and accompanying text.
262. See 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 1, § 2292 (so long as legal advice is sought from a
professional legal adviser in his capacity as such, communications relating to such purpose
are made in confidence by clients and protection has not been waived). As noted earlier,
communications relating to a future crime or fraud are not protected by this rule because the
seeking of such advice is not a legitimate use of the attorney-client relationship. See supra
note 113 and accompanying text.
263. For criticisms of the present broad scope of attorney-client privilege, see authorities
cited supra note 117.
264. See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
265. Cf. P- VEATCH, supra note 20, at 309-10 (rejecting "radical legalism" approach, in
which moral rules would track legal rules in their "rigid" application to particular cases). Of
course rules embodied in a disciplinary code of ethics are legal, as well as ethical rules. None-
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there are interests at stake other than the discovery of truth in liti-
gation, insistence on an ethics rule that affords absolute protection
for information concerning past misconduct may not withstand
closer scrutiny, either in cases involving completed client acts or in
the more troublesome cases involving ongoing client activity.
a. Past Client Acts. Even aside from any misplaced reliance on
the evidentiary privilege itself, 6 6 it is not surprising that informa-
tion concerning past client misconduct is given favored treatment
under the various ethics codes. The client's interest in seeking legal
advice regarding past wrongs is, at least historically, the paradigm
of the important interests sought to be protected under confidential-
ity rules. Moreover, society in general has a strong interest in en-
couraging the use of the legal process to resolve individual disputes,
and attorneys have a substantial and legitimate interest in avoiding
the unenviable position of becoming habitual informers of their cli-
ent's misdeeds. z67
The traditional distinction between past and future conduct can
also be justified under the two basic philosophical approaches.
Under utilitarianism, the chilling effect of disclosure in the case of
past misconduct will certainly be stronger than in the case of future
misconduct, because clients lack the option of avoiding disclosure
by renouncing their intent to commit the act in question.268 Under
a privacy analysis, there is at least an arguable distinction between
"guilty" (past) and "dangerous" (future) information,269 based on
the dual needs of the client to keep secret that information closest to
his "core self'2 0 and to communicate such information to his confi-
dential adviser.271
While the philosophical approach does support the traditionally
strong distinction between past and future misconduct, it does not
theless, rules of evidence are often viewed as requiring even more certainty than many other
legal rules, because of the special demands of trial preparation. See, eg., FED. R. EVID.
Article VIII advisory committee note (rejecting case-by-case approach to hearsay exceptions
in favor of traditional system of class exceptions).
266. See supra notes 97-120 and accompanying text.
267. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
268. In addition, preventing the harm of future misconduct is probably a greater benefit
to society than ensuring that past misconduct results in legally proper sanctions or punish-
ment. See Landesman, supra note 14, at 200-01; Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 16, 448 P.2d
490, 498 (1968).
269. Landesman, supra note 14, at 200.
270. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
271. Landesman, supra note 14, at 200. If the right to privacy is grounded in fundamen-
tal human needs, see supra note 65, then the motivation for disclosure to the attorney is
clearly a significant factor in assessing the strength of privacy interests in particular cases.
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necessarily support the nearly absolute protection afforded past mis-
conduct under the ethics rules. Under both the Model Rules272
and the most recent interpretation of the Model Code,2 73 the duty
of confidentiality almost always prevails over any interest in disclos-
ing past misconduct-a positon which has strong support under in-
terpretations of the former Canons.274 There is some support-
both historically and more recently-for an exception to this abso-
lute protection in cases involving past "frauds."275 However, this
exception is itself exceedingly narrow,2 76 particularly when it is in-
272. In nonlitigation contexts, the lawyer is permitted to disclose client confidences only
when expressly or impliedly authorized by the client, when necessary to prevent the client
from committing a criminal act likely to result in imminent death or bodily harm, or when
necessary for the lawyer to resolve legal controversies with the client or defend against certain
claims. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6 (1983). While there is no
provision expressly permitting disclosure of past misconduct, as there is in the Model Code,
see infra note 273, the comment to Rule 1.6 suggests that such disclosures may be permissible
indirectly in the form of public "notice of the fact of withdrawal" or disaffirmation of any
prior "opinion, document, affirmation or the like." Id. Rule 1.6 comment. See A. KAUF-
MAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 210-11 (2d ed. 1984) (probably in-
tended for situations when lawyer's services were used to perpetrate crime or fraud). The
problem with interpreting the rule to allow public withdrawals and disaffirmations is that
such an interpretation appears to contradict the principle of confidentiality that the rule seeks
to protect. Id For a brief discussion of the legislative history of Rule 1.6 in relation to DR 7-
102(B)(1) of the Model Code, see id. at 209-10.
273. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1983) (disclo-
sure of past client fraud required, "except when the information is protected as a privileged
communiction"). See ABA Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op.
341 (1975) (interprets DR 7-102(B)(1) to preclude disclosure of "confidences" protected by
evidentiary privilege, as well as "secrets" protected under DR 4-101(A)); supra note 103.
Opinion 341 is commonly viewed as a practical nullification of the disclosure requirements of
DR 7-102(B)(I). See Wolfram, Client Perjury I supra note 190, at 820. For a detailed dis-
cussion of the ABA's attempts to deal with the client fraud dilemma under the Model Code,
see Note, supra note 102, at 96-104.
274. See, ag., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Informal Op. 778
(1964) (even when third party injured through client misconduct, no disclosure permitted,
since there was no fraud upon court itself); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Griev-
anees, Formal Op. 287 (1953) (suggests that, in civil litigation, disclosure of past fraud is
permissible only when client secured improper advantage over other party). For a detailed
history of the ABA's attempts to deal with the client fraud dilemma under the former Ca-
nons, see Note, supra note 102, at 92-96.
275. Professor Kramer notes that the recent support for a meaningful provision permit-
ting disclosure of client fraud is not new, but rather, rests on assumptions apparently ac-
cepted at the time when both former Canon 41 and the original version of DR 7-102(B)(1)
were enacted. See Kramer, supra note 190, at 999. Moreover, some states did not enact the
1974 amendment to DR 7-102(B), see Note, supra note 102, at 105, and at least one state that
adopted the Model Rules provided for some disclosure of past client fraud. LAWYERS' MAN-
UAL ON PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT, CURRENT REPORTS (BNA) 382 (Aug. 22, 1984) (N.J.
Rule 1.6 permits disclosure of information necessary to rectify consequences of client's crimi-
nal, illegal or fraudulent act when lawyer's services were used).
276. While the term "fraud," as used in DR 7-102(B)(1), is not defined, it is probably
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terpreted to exclude both frauds that are also CriMes 2 7 7 and frauds
committed without the participation of the lawyer contemplating
disclosure.278
Recent efforts have been made to resurrect a meaningful excep-
tion for disclosure of past client fraud and even to expand that ex-
ception to include "deliberately wrongful acts," or at least criminal
acts, whether or not they are also frauds.279 Philosophical analysis
may prove helpful in determining, first, whether any exception
should be recognized; second, if so, whether it should be limited to
civil frauds; and, third, whether the exception should apply only
when the lawyer himself has been a participant in the past
wrongdoing.
The justification for disclosure of completed wrongs will depend
initially on the purpose to be served by such disclosure. If revela-
tions are contemplated in order to ensure that proper legal sanc-
limited to common law fraud, in which some element of both misrepresentation and scienter
are required. See Note, supra note 102, at 106.
277. See Callan & David, supra note 13, at 358; cf. G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRAC-
TICE OF LAW 26 (1978) (assumes without explanation that DR 7-102(3)(1) applies only to
frauds that are not crimes). Callan and David argue that "any rule of ethics which required
an attorney to disclose information concerning his client's past crimes would interfere with
the client's exercise of his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination and seriously
undermine the proper functioning of the criminal justice system." Id. These arguments are
equally applicable to client perjury, see Brazil, supra note 210, at 624-39, and, yet, the disclo-
sure of client perjury is now required under the Model Rules. See supra note 189 and accom-
panying text; cf. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-108(G) (1983)
(requires disclosure of improper conduct of juror or by client toward a juror: no exception
for criminal misconduct); In re Kozlov, 156 N.J. Super. 316, 325, 383 A.2d 1158, 1162 (1978)
(resolves any conflict between DR 7-108(G) and DR 4-101(B) in favor of required disclosure
under DR 7-108(G)). Moreover, even if the law forbade the use of an attorney's statements
in a subsequent criminal proceeding against the client, there is no reason why an attorney
should not be encouraged to make out-of-court disclosures, if necessary to protect other im-
portant interests. See infra notes 281-86 and accompanying text; cf. MODEL RULES OF PRO-
FESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft 1981) (permissive disclosure to
rectify consequences of client's misconduct included both crimes and frauds).
278. DR 7-102(B)(1) requires only that past frauds subject to mandatory disclosure must
have been committed "in the course of the representation." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(B)(1) (1983). At least one commentary has argued that DR 7-
102(B)(1) was "designed to deal with situations in which the lawyer has been used to commit
the fraud" and should be so interpreted. See Note, supra note 102, at 107 n.76; see also
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft 1981)
(permissive disclosure to rectify past client crimes or frauds limited to situations in which
lawyer's services were used).
279. See, eg., MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Proposed
Final Draft 1981) (permitted disclosure of past client crimes or frauds in which lawyer's
services were used); MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c)(2) (Discussion
Draft 1980) (permitted disclosure of any "deliberately wrongful act by client," except when
lawyer employed after commission of act to represent client concerning act).
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tions are applied, then confidentiality should clearly prevail, given
"the alarming image of an open-ended commitment by lawyers to
police the legal system."28 In the case of lawyer-assisted wrongs, if
the only purpose served by the disclosure is, as one commentator
suggests, to protect the lawyer from any "taint of falsity, 2 81 then
again confidentiality should prevail, since protecting the reputation
of lawyers is not a compelling reason to expose clients to almost
certain legal harm.282
Obviously, there are far more important reasons why a lawyer
might want to reveal a client's past misconduct. There may be
"emergencies" in which death or substantial bodily harm could be
prevented.283 Disclosure would almost certainly be warranted in
such cases. The danger of any chilling effect on future clients is
limited,284 the client's right to privacy will almost always be over-
280. Popkin, Client-Lawyer Confidentiality, 59 Tx. L. REv. 755, 770 (1981). While this
quote was actually made in the context of arguing against disclosure in order to prevent the
harm of unlawful conduct, it argues more persuasively against disclosure in order to assure
compliance with the law. Under a utilitarian analysis, society does not benefit greatly from
any single instance in which compliance with the law is secured, so long as legal sanctions are
generally effective. See Landesman, supra note 14, at 200-01. Similarly, under a privacy
analysis, individuals may have strong interests in preventing or rectifying the harm of a legal
wrong against them, but it is by no means obvious that they have strong interests in simply
having the law enforced. Finally, under social contract theory, the prospect of lawyers polic-
ing the legal system is clearly incompatible with the interests of either society or the lawyers
themselves.
281. Popkin, supra note 280, at 766 (discussing several examples in Proposed Final Draft
of Model Rules).
282. Cf. Moore, Conflicts of Interests in the Simultaneous Representation of Multiple Cli-
ents: A Proposed Solution to the Current Confusion and Controversy, 61 Tax. L. REv. 211,
227-28 (1982) (approving abandonment of consideration of "appearance of impropriety" in
Model Rules' treatment of conflicts of interest problems).
283. For example, an attorney who refused to reveal the whereabouts of the bodies of two
girls murdered by his client later stated that if the girls had been alive he would have divulged
his client's confidence "because life is primary." See Nelson, Ethical Dilemma: Should Law-
yers Turn in Clients?, L.A. Times, July 2, 1974, at 1, col. 1, reprinted in A. KAuFMAN, supra
note 272, at 218-21. Professor Kaufman poses a related problem in which the client confesses
to the lawyer that he is guilty of a murder for which an innocent man was convicted and may
be sentenced to a term of years, life imprisonment, or death. A. KAuFMAN, supra note 272,
at 212-13 (problem based on real-life incident in which lawyer remained silent and defendant
was lynched after a death sentence was commuted to life imprisonment). Cf. Spaulding v.
Zimmerman, 263 Minn. 346, 116 N.W.2d 704 (1962) (lawyer for insurance company discov-
ered that plaintiff was suffering from life-threatening aneurism of which he and his doctors
were unaware).
284. While it may well be true that clients who are aware of the life-threatening aspects
of their confidential information will be reluctant to confide in their attorneys, there is no
reason to suspect any substantial spill-over to clients who have no reason to suspect the exist-
ence of such an "emergency." Cf. supra notes 38-39, 69-70, 79-80 and accompanying text
(widespread acceptance by doctors and philosophers alike of physician's duty to disclose in
such limited "emergency" situations). Moreover, even with regard to those clients aware of
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ridden by the interests of potential victims,28 and there does not
appear to be any significant threat to the client-care perspective in
other, non-emergency situations. Moreover, when such "emergen-
cies" do arise, there is no apparent reason why disclosure ought to
be limited to past "frauds," whether criminal or civil, or even to
situations in which the lawyer participated in the client's initial
wrongdoing.
Aside from these "emergencies," there are other situations in
which the reasons underlying disclosure are arguably more impor-
tant than the mere imposition of legal sanctions. The two most fre-
quently mentioned are the prevention or rectification of substantial
harm (not limited to personal injury) and the satisfaction of a mor-
ally appropriate urge on the part of the lawyer to rectify a wrong in
which he participated, even if unwittingly. While strong arguments
can be made on behalf of disclosure in both cases, there are trouble-
some aspects to each which have not always been recognized by the
proponents of broader disclosure options.
One of the Kutak Commission's early drafts recognized the pre-
vention or rectification of substantial harm as a sufficient reason to
disclose in all cases of "deliberately wrongful" client acts, "except
when the lawyer has been employed after the commission of such
an act to represent the client concerning the act and its conse-
the dangers of confiding in their attorneys, any chilling effect will be reduced by such impor-
tant factors as the likelihood that the information will eventually become public and the need
of the client to obtain the lawyer's advice regardless of the consequences. See D. Luban,
supra note 91, at 31-32 (discussing Ford Motor Co.'s knowledge that it would be sued for
injuries attributable to defectively designed Pinto and the company's inability to function
effectively without legal advice). Some chilling effect will undoubtedly remain; however, util-
itarian analysis would not favor maintaining confidentiality in these "emergencies" unless the
harm of deterrence outweighed the harm prevented in other cases. For a discussion of some
of the difficulties in using the utilitarian approach in an analogous medical context, see supra
notes 71-75 and accompanying text (psychiatric patient threatening to kill an innocent third
person).
285. The primary difference between disclosure of past and future misconduct is that, in
the case of the former, disclosure will result not only in the publication of embarrassing
information, but also in the almost inevitable harm of legal liability for the past (and unalter-
able) conduct. When this harm is primarily economic, it is not difficult to favor the physical
interests of the innocent victim. When, however, the harm is more fundamentally related to
basic human needs, as in cases where the client will be subject to lengthy imprisonment, or
perhaps even death, it may not be so obvious that the interests of the victim should prevail.
One commentator has proposed providing use immunity for clients whose attorneys divulge
such confidences to a court. Note, Attorney-Client Confidentiality: A New Approach, 4 HoF-
srRA L. REv. 685 (1976). While the promise of such immunity may not induce the guilty to
come forward, see A. KAuFmAN, supra note 272, at 213, it may make disclosure more accept-
able under a privacy analysis. In addition, it may satisfy legal objections to disclosure based
on concern for a potential criminal defendant's constitutional rights. See supra note 277.
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quences. ' '286 At first glance, this provision appears to resolve many
of the difficulties involved in lawyer disclosure of past client acts. It
substantially reduces the danger of any chilling effect (and indeed
may even encourage client candor) by permitting disclosure only
when the client did not seek legal advice in connection with the
perpetration of the past wrong. Similarly, it limits invasions of a
client's privacy by confining disclosure primarily to "secrets. ' 28 7 In
addition, it maintains the client-care perspective in at least the para-
digm case of the "man-in-trouble ' 288 with no one to turn to except
his lawyer.
While this early draft provision makes a strong distinction be-
tween past and future conduct, there is a lingering suspicion that
the distinction is not yet strong enough. For example, the client
may have committed a "deliberately wrongful" act but may not
have sought legal assistance for any number of reasons, including a
simple inability to face the prospect of devastating consequences to
himself or his family in the event that his prior act was discovered.
Given that he can no longer avoid these consequences by altering
his conduct, he appears to be in need of and, indeed deserving of,
greater protection than a client who is contemplating future harm-
ful conduct. Nonetheless, under this early draft provision, his past
wrong is treated no differently than a similar future wrong. Indeed,
he is even worse off than a client who is sophisticated enough to
know that by "confessing" to his lawyer he can insure against any
unwanted disclosure.
Apparently recognizing the difficulties of this early draft provi-
sion, the Kutak Commission revised it substantially in the Proposed
Final Draft submitted to the ABA House of Delegates. Under the
revised draft, disclosure of past conduct was to be limited to rectify-
ing "the consequences of a client's criminal or fraudulent act," but
286. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.7(c)(2) (Discussion Draft
1980).
287. Ordinarily, a lawyer would not learn of a client's deliberately wrongful acts through
a confidential communication unless the client had employed the lawyer to represent him
concerning such misconduct. The primary exception would appear to be client confessions
regarding past misconduct in which the lawyer unwittingly participated. It is unclear
whether such confessions would fall within the exception to permissive disclosure in situa-
tions in which the lawyer is being "re-employed" to represent the client in connection with
the past wrong. In any event, while client "secrets" are ordinarily less private than confiden-
tial communications, see supra note 103, there are situations in which even "secrets" may
have strong privacy claims. See infra note 297 and accompanying text.
288. D. MELINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 270-71 (1973).
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only if the lawyer's services had been used.2 89 The official Com-
ment to this section explained the limitation to crimes and frauds
by reference to the traditional prohibition on lawyer assistance in
these cases, and further explained that such disclosure satisfied the
lawyer's own "legitimate interest in being able to rectify the conse-
quences of such conduct."2 9
The justification for limiting the ban on lawyer assistance to sit-
uations involving crimes and frauds2 91 does not in itself justify a
similar limitation on disclosure of information harmful to a client.
Even if there is some argument for limiting disclosure offuture con-
duct to crimes and frauds-that is, because they tend to isolate the
most likely instances in which disclosure is morally appropri-
ate29 2-this argument should not apply when the client has deliber-
ately tricked the lawyer into assisting in wrongful conduct,
whatever the precise legal character. In such cases, the reasons ad-
vanced for permitting the lawyer to disclose past conduct must be
further analyzed before concluding that disclosure is most likely to
be appropriate, if at all, only in cases involving crimes or frauds.
The Kutak Commission reasoned that lawyers should be per-
mitted to disclose past conduct because lawyers have a "legitimate
interest in being able to rectify the consequences" of conduct for
which they would have been ethically barred from giving any assist-
ance had they known the circumstances.293 If disclosure were then
required, it might make sense to distinguish between lawyer conduct
that is absolutely prohibited and lawyer conduct that is not. How-
ever, by merely permitting disclosure, the Commission appeared to
attach greater significance to the lawyer's own status as a morally
autonomous agent than it did to the underlying conduct. Once the
lawyer's status as moral agent is recognized, it should be apparent
that the autonomy of the lawyer is equally, perhaps even more fully,
implicated when the lawyer had an ethical choice of whether or not
to assist the client and the resulting choice was made on the basis of
a deliberate deception. Moreover, when the client's conduct was a
legal as well as a moral wrong, the lawyer's indignation at being
exposed to possible, even if unwarranted, legal sanctions is just as
compelling as when the possible charge is one of crime or fraud. In
289. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b)(3) (Proposed Final Draft
1981).
290. Id. Rule 1.6 comment.
291. See supra notes 234-38 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
293. See supra note 290 and accompanying text.
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all of these cases the lawyer has a legitimate interest in rectifying
the consequences of conduct that he would not knowingly have as-
sisted. Nonetheless, the question remains whether, and to what ex-
tent, that interest should be overridden by the client's interest in
maintaining confidentiality.
Proponents of broader disclosure options typically argue that
clients who knowingly deceive their lawyers do not have any legiti-
mate interest in maintaining confidentiality. By choosing not to
confide, these clients have forfeited any rights they might otherwise
have had to rely on the confidentiality of the lawyer-client relation-
ship.2 94 This conclusion initially appears to be supported by philo-
sophical analysis. The option of subsequent disclosure of false
confidences by the lawyer should encourage, rather than discour-
age, initial client candor. Further, the right to privacy in a confi-
dential relationship may depend on the truthfulness of the
communication, or at least may be forfeited when the client "uses"
the lawyer.295
Nonetheless, proponents of disclosure typically fail to consider
that more legitimate concerns for confidentiality may arise as a re-
sult of the way in which the lawyer subsequently discovers the ini-
tial client deception. For example, when the client voluntarily
"confesses," that communication appears to fall within the class of
communications typically favored under rules of confidentiality.296
Similarly, distinctions could be drawn between the situation in
which a lawyer discovers the truth while examining private client
papers and the situation in which a lawyer receives an unsolicited
phone call from a disinterested third party.2 97 Certainly, the man-
294. See, eg., Note, supra note 102, at 114. In addition, it is commonly agreed that there
is no conflict with the evidentiary privilege, since communications made to further a crime or
fraud are not included within the privilege. See id. at 111-12; cf Kramer, supra note 190, at
994 n.14 ("not privileged under the common law").
295. Cf. Note, supra note 102, at 114 ("[t]hat a lawyer who attempts to rectify a fraud his
client has used him to commit could be castigated for 'a gross violation of a sacred trust' is
ludicrous").
Under social contract analysis, the focus would be on the mutuality of obligation between
client and lawyer. The lawyer's promise to maintain confidentiality is made in return for the
client's promise to make full disclosure. Cf. supra note 67 (basis of prima facie obligation in
physician-patient relationship is promise-keeping). To the extent that the client's breach has
significant implications for the lawyer's own sense of autonomy, i.e., the lawyer was tricked
into doing what he would not otherwise have chosen to do, the lawyer would be justified in
refusing to maintain confidentiality.
296. See supra text accompanying notes 266-67. As to the evidentiary privilege, while the
inital deceptive communications would not be privileged, see supra note 294, the subsequent
confession would be, so long as it was not itself part of an intended future crime or fraud.
297. This distinction is one which would be made under ABA Opinion 341, which inter-
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ner in which the deceit is discovered appears to have relevance both
to the utility of lawyer disclosure and the significance of an invasion
of client privacy.298
Even so, it is unclear whether a rule that protects "confidences"
but not "secrets," or "confidences and secrets" but not other infor-
mation, is sufficient to resolve the lawyer's dilemma. For example,
even when the client voluntarily "confesses," the lawyer still has a
legitimate interest in correcting a harm that he unwittingly assisted.
Must he now subordinate that interest to the client's and treat the
clientjust as if the client were reporting a past wrong in which the
lawyer was entirely uninvolved? What if he senses that the client's
"confession" is only voluntary in the sense that the client knows
that the laywer is about to discover the deceit in any event? Per-
haps the client's initial betrayal of the lawyer is a fact of sufficient
importance that the lawyer ought to retain the right to rectify the
harm done. Given that lawyers will rarely exercise this right, its
recognition should not be unduly threatening to clients with legiti-
mate interests in maintaining client confidentiality.
In summary, philosophical analysis does not necessarily resolve
the lawyer's dilemma in all cases in which disclosure of past client
wrongs might be morally appropriate. Nonetheless, it does clearly
call for a rejection of the nearly absolute protection afforded past
misconduct under both the Model Code and the Model Rules. It
does so, first, because these codes make no provision for disclosure
in rare "emergencies" (for example, when death or substantial bod-
ily harm could be prevented), and, second, because those codes
make insufficient provision for rectification of past client wrongs
when the lawyer himself was a witting or unwitting participant.
b. Continuing Client Conduct. The traditional treatment of
"continuing" client conduct is conflicting and ambiguous. To some
extent this lack of consensus results from mere disagreement re-
garding the value of confidentiality (as reflected in the nearly abso-
lute protection of information concerning wholly past wrongs) as
opposed to the value of preventing future harm (as reflected in the
lack of such extensive protection for information concerning wholly
preted amended DR 7-102(B)(1) to preclude disclosure of past fraud when discovered
through either "confidences" or "secrets" under DR 4-101(A)(1). ABA Comm. on Ethics
and Professional Responsibility, Formal Op. 341 (1975).
298. Obviously, the utility of confidentiality is greatest when it applies to information
obtained directly from the client. Similarly, the betrayal of a client's privacy is greatest when
the client himself grants the lawyer access to the "inner circle" of the client's self. Cf. supra
note 66 and accompanying text (analogous discussion in the patient-physician context).
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future wrongs). However, the conceptual confusion surrounding
the term itself and the resulting failure to distinguish among varying
types of continuing wrongs and the differing contexts in which they
arise may be even more important.
A "continuing" wrong is typically defined as "one which,
though committed in the past has ramifications or effects that con-
tinue into the future." '299 This definition appears to be both overin-
clusive and underinclusive. For example, since almost every past
wrong has continuing consequences, a literal application would
seem to obliterate any meaningful distinction between past and fu-
ture conduct. 3" In addition, the definition appears to exclude
cases in which the client is engaging in a series of separate but re-
lated acts or omissions, some of which are completed and some of
which are merely intended. If disclosure of the client's intent to
commit a future wrong will necessarily or inevitably reveal related
past wrongs,30 1 then the client's conduct is neither wholly "past"
nor wholly "future" and is perhaps best analyzed as but one of sev-
eral forms of continuing wrongdoing.
Aside from the lack of conceptual clarity, the failure to consider
the varying contexts in which continuing wrongs occur has clearly
contributed to the confusion in this area. Most authorities have
considered the problem in the contexts of the fugitive from justice
(jumping bail)302 and the continuing violation of a court order.30 3
However, these examples involve the attorney as an advocate and
thus raise a host of problems-for example, the scope of the attor-
ney-client privilege and the attorney's responsibilities to the court-
which are rarely present in a nonlitigation setting. Moreover, even
in nonlitigation, the differing contexts in which the problem arises
299. Callan & David, supra note 13, at 363. See also A. KAUFmAN, supra note 272, at
217 ("In the continuing crime case, the criminal act has already been committed; its conse-
quences continue.").
300. G. BELLOW & B. MOULTON, THE LAWYERING PROCESS 260 (1978).
301. This was precisely the dilemma the Singer Hutner lawyers found themselves in when
they became suspicious that their most important client, O.P.M. Leasing Services, Inc., was
in the midst of one of the biggest white-collar crimes in history. See O.P.M. Fraud Raises
Questions About Role of a Criminal's Lawyer, Wall St. J., Dec. 31, 1982, at 1, col. 6.
302. See, eg., ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 156
(1936) (attorney must notify authorities of location of client who has left jurisdiction in viola-
tion of his parole); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 155
(1936) (attorney must reveal location of fugitive client with whom he has been in communica-
tion); ABA Comm. on Professional Ethics and Grievances, Formal Op. 23 (1930) (attorney
need not disclose location of fugitive client obtained by confidential communication with
client's family).
303. See, eg., Brennan v. Brennan, 281 Pa. Super. 362, 422 A.2d 510 (1980); Dike v.
Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 448 P.2d 490 (1968).
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(e.g. securities, antitrust, tax, domestic relations law) require sensi-
tivity to such relevant factors as the specific purpose of attorney
disclosure (law enforcement versus prevention of substantial harm)
and the extent of attorney participation in various stages of the cli-
ent's continuing conduct.
Initially, some clarification of the problem might be achieved by
eliminating from consideration those cases that appear to be ade-
quately treated elsewhere. For example, the mere continuation of
the harmful effects of an otherwise completed client wrong does not
appear to call for ethical analysis separate from wholly past con-
duct. As long as there is provision for disclosure in rare "emergen-
cies"-such as the threat of death or substantial bodily harm-
protection of legitimate client interests suggests that confidentiality
must be maintained. 3" Similarly, when an attorney has been a par-
ticipant in past client wrongdoing, disclosure may be warranted
even in the absence of ongoing or intended future conduct, and thus
the "continuing" aspects of such conduct are but additional reasons
favoring disclosure in particular cases.30 5 Finally, continuing
wrongs in a litigation context rarely pose the threat of substantial
harm which are encountered in nonlitigation. Of course, an attor-
ney may not assist his client in remaining a fugitive from justice306
or otherwise violating a court order307 and may be forced to with-
draw30 8 (or perhaps even disclose in compelled testimony)30 9 in or-
der to avoid doing so. Nonetheless, whether his unique role as
"officer of the court" requires an advocate to voluntarily reveal any
continuing misconduct toward the court is a question best consid-
ered separately from continuing harms in a nonlitigation setting. 10
As to what remains of "continuing" client conduct, perhaps the
most fruitful analysis may be to examine those factors that best
characterize the conduct as closer to either wholly past or wholly
future conduct and then apply the standards that have already been
developed for such conduct. For example, if a client who has com-
304. See supra notes 281-85 and accompanying text.
305. See supra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
306. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(A)(7) (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1983).
307. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-106(A) (1983);
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4(c) (1983).
308. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(a)(1) (1983).
309. Cf. Dike v. Dike, 75 Wash. 2d 1, 14, 448 P.2d 490, 498 (1968) (attorney not privi-
leged to withhold testimony regarding whereabouts of wife who may have been in violation of
temporary child custody order).
310. For a brief summary of the ABA Ethics Committee opinions addressing this ques-
tion, see A. KAUFMAN, supra note 272, at 214-16.
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mitted larceny continues to commit the additional crime of conceal-
ing stolen property,311 and his continuing crime cannot be
terminated without implicating himself in either or both crimes,
then the essentially "unalterable" nature of the client's conduct sug-
gests that it is best treated as if it were already completed. On the
other hand, if disclosure of a client's intent to make an illegal bribe
will necessarily reveal past bribes of a similar nature, but the client
retains the option of avoiding disclosure by renouncing his wrongful
intent, then the continuing conduct is probably best treated as if it
were wholly future.
There are, of course, cases that appear to fall somewhere in be-
tween these two extremes. For example, in the securities field the
client may be under a legal obligation to make affimative disclosure
of completed events of an incriminating nature.312 Theoretically,
there is an event yet to take place (the legally significant nondisclo-
sure), which suggests that the client still retains the option of avoid-
ing liability for a future wrong. Yet, compliance necessarily entails
the disclosure of a completed, unalterable, illegal event.313 The
mandatory disclosure of a past wrong suggests an important distinc-
tion between this continuing wrong and a wholly future wrong.
Nonetheless, it appears that this case is still more appropriately
treated as a future and not a past event, since the harmful conse-
quences of conduct yet to occur can be prevented. Here, it is the
substantive law and not the lawyer's conduct that limits the client's
right to avoid implicating himself in a completed legal wrong.31 4
311. See Callan & David, supra note 13, at 363. Similar examples include continued
possession of an illegal weapon, a still undetected fraudulent tax return and the retention of
embezzled funds. Id.
312. See, e.g., Hoffman, On Learning of a Corporate Client's Crime or Fraud-The Law-
yer's Dilemma, 33 Bus. LAw. 1389, 1411-18 (1978).
313. Prior to the filing of the preliminary registration statement, the client can avoid
liability for a future wrong and disclosure of a past wrong by refusing to file the statement.
See id. at 1413. Once the preliminary registration is filed, however, the client may not with-
draw it without obtaining SEC approval stating fully the grounds for such withdrawal. Id. at
1413-14.
314. Cf. Rosenfeld, supra note 18, at 516-24 (extent to which ethical dilemmas of corpo-
rate attorney are attributable to substantive corporate and securities laws which create posi-
tive duties on part of client to disclose past crimes and other wrongs).
The position I am advocating here is different from the position sometimes advocated by
members of the SEC, which is that lawyers have a duty to disclose in order to assist the SEC
in its enforcement efforts. See, eg., Sommer, The Emerging Responsibilities of the Securities
Lawyer [1973-1974 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 79, at 631 (Jan., 1974).
First, the suggestion here is that disclosure be permissive, not mandatory. Second, as noted
above, the justification for such permissive disclosure is not to prevent violations of the law,
but rather to protect against substantial harm to others. If the harm to be prevented is mini-
mal, or if the victims will have adequate recourse in a subsequent lawsuit against the client
1985]
CASE WESTERN RESERVE LAW REVIEW
III. CONCLUSION
As in the physician-patient relationship, the principle of confi-
dentiality in the attorney-client relationship is well-grounded in
both utilitarian and deontological moral theory. At least with re-
spect to individual clients,"' 5 the attorney is clearly under a prima
facie duty not to disclose information relating to the subject of the
representation without the client's consent. Just as in medical eth-
ics, however, difficult questions do arise in determining when this
prima facie duty ought to be overridden by other, more weighty
considerations. Under utilitarian theory, the answer lies in attempts
to make realistic assumptions regarding, first, the extent to which
clients would actually be deterred from confiding in their attorneys
and, second, the net balance of benefit over harm, both to present
and potential victims. Under deonotological theory, the answer lies
in determining whether the client's right to privacy is forfeited en-
tirely by an act of unjust aggression or simply overridden by other,
more important rights and duties. While neither approach results
in easy solutions to all of the perennial problems of confidentialty
and disclosure, the "philosophically informed" approach can be
useful, both in evaluating various provisions of current and pro-
posed ethics codes for lawyers and in suggesting areas for future
exploration by lawyers and philosophers alike.
The philosophically informed approach suggests that many of
the present provisions of the Model Code and the Model Rules are
not adequately justified. Moreover, the preceding discussion implic-
itly suggests a number of questions needing far more extensive anal-
ysis than has yet been provided. For example, in civil litigation, it is
not clear whether a "breakdown" in the adversary system, as a re-
sult of either inadequate resources or incompetent counsel, man-
dates recognition of at least some limited duty of benevolence
toward opponents and, if so, what the limits of that duty might
be.316 Moreover, in criminal cases, the justification for a duty to
report client perjury depends, in part, on a clearer understanding of
what autonomy or human dignity means in the context of our crim-
inal justice system." 7 Finally, in nonlitigation, the resolution of a
number of disclosure dilemmas appears to depend on the desirabil-
ity of allowing lawyers to exercise fairly broad discretion in deter-
(assuming they will have knowledge of the violation), then there is probably no moral obliga-
tion to disclose.
315. See supra note 91.
316. See supra notes 184-88 and accompanying text.
317. See supra notes 201-10 and accompanying text.
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mining when disclosure is morally appropriate. 31 8 A related
question, of potentially even broader scope, concerns the function of
ethics codes in general and the extent to which such codes, as a
form of legal regulation, can ever be coextensive with the require-
ments of morality-whether ordinary or professional.319
From the outset, my primary purpose has been to stimulate and
extend the discussion of legal ethics in relation to recent philosophi-
cal work. Obviously there is a great deal more to be done in order
to reap the potential benefits of a meaningful collaboration between
lawyers and philosophers. In addition, collaboration among the dif-
ferent professions, with the assistance of philosophers, is an ideal
that has yet to be realized. Just as physicians and lawyers gain in-
sights from philosophical analysis, each of these professions, and
others as well, will benefit from further exploration of both their
similarities and their differences. The coming decade will undoubt-
edly witness a great deal more of the philosophically informed and
comparative approaches to problems in professional ethics.
318. See supra notes 246-49, 260-61 and accompanying text.
319. See Ladd, The Quest for a Professional Code of Ethics: An Intellectual and Moral
Confusion, in PROFESSIONAL ETHICS ACTIVITIES IN THE SCIENTIFIC AND ENGINEERING
SOCIETIES 154 (1980).
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